Ben West
Piracy off the coast of
Somalia has dropped off dramatically in 2012. Successful ship hijackings have
decreased from 31 in 2011 (and 49 in 2010) to only four so far in 2012. Attacks
against ships have also decreased, falling from 199 reported attacks in the
first nine months of 2011 to 70 attacks over the same span in 2012 -- a 65
percent drop. However, diminished activity does not necessarily mean a decrease
in the cost of sailing around the Horn of Africa. Somali pirates occupy a
unique position, which is right along highly strategic global shipping lanes
yet outside the reach of any national power. For international actors, it is
politically and militarily easier to try to contain the Somali piracy threat
than to eliminate it. But containment comes at a high cost.
Controlling Territory
Many factors have contributed
to the decrease in pirate hijackings in 2012. One factor is that shipping
companies have begun equipping their ships with more countermeasures, namely
armed guards. For several years, commercial ships sailing in the Indian Ocean
have used other countermeasures, such as fences, water cannons and adjusted
tactics like disabling the ship. But the widespread deployment of armed guards
beginning in 2011 (guards had been used sparingly as far back as 2008) has a
very close correlation to the recent decrease in hijackings. In late 2009, only
about 10-20 percent of commercial ships sailing through waters where Somali
pirates operate carried guards; today, some estimates put the percentage as
high as 70 percent. To date, pirates have never successfully hijacked a ship
that had armed guards. But it should be noted that, even though the use of
armed guards appears to be the most effective countermeasure against piracy,
there are other factors at work.
For instance, government
officials also attribute the drop-off in attacks and hijackings to better
coordination between foreign naval patrols, which have made the waters off the
Somali coast a less permissive environment for pirate operations. With several
years of practice, sailors from international missions such as the U.S.-backed
Combined Task Force 151 and the EU-backed Atalanta mission as well as from the
unilateral missions of China, Russia, Iran and others have had time to study
pirate activity and become more efficient at stopping attacks.
Several dozen foreign naval
ships are deployed to secure the waters for commercial shipping at any given
time. Their focus is escorting ships through the Gulf of Aden, but the area of
pirate activity is much larger than that, reaching across the Arabian Sea to
India and Madagascar. Effectively patrolling such a large area requires
intelligence and the development of a counterpiracy doctrine that includes
going after the larger pirate vessels, called mother ships, that extend
pirates' range and allow them to operate in rougher seas during the monsoon.
Taken together, the increased
use of armed guards aboard commercial ships and the growing effectiveness of
foreign naval patrols have contributed to undermining the pirates' control over
the seas. Three years ago pirates were largely uncontested, but now they face a
more coordinated defense. They hijacked commercial ships because they were
relatively soft targets -- which could be taken by four people with AK-47s, a
fishing boat and a ladder -- making the millions of dollars in profit from a
ransom payment very attractive. The armed guards and naval patrols have not
eliminated piracy, but they have increased the costs of attacking and seizing a
commercial ship. Because pirates are motivated more by profit than by any
ideology, a decrease in profitability will deter them from engaging in the
practice.
Still, whatever the status of
the sea, the coastal towns of Somalia, such as Hobyo and Haradheere, are still
out of the control of any national or international force. The Puntland
Maritime Police Force, which began operations in early 2012 with the help of
Arab funding, made some progress in denying pirates sanctuary on land, but
political contention prevents it from controlling the territory outright,
making pirate activity still a very attractive economic model in central
Somalia.
When piracy flared in the
Strait of Malacca in the early 2000s, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia were
able to pursue the pirates on land and deny them sanctuary because they had the
security forces and territorial integrity to do so. This is also true currently
on the western coast of Africa in the Gulf of Guinea, where pirates
occasionally hijack ships even though they have no ports in which to anchor the
vessels. Since the West African governments have control -- however tenuous --
over their own sovereign territory, they still have the means to track down
hijacked ships and keep pirates from creating sanctuaries. Somalia, on the
other hand, has struggled for decades to control its territory. Over the past
few years, it hasn't even been able to fully control Mogadishu, its capital,
against the Islamist threat from al Shabaab. The new Somali federal government
still lacks the capability to control pirate towns such as Hobyo and
Haradheere, and its officials do not appear to want a strong Puntland doing it
for them.
By wresting maritime control
from Somali pirates, commercial shipping companies and foreign navies have
reduced the number of attacks but have not eliminated the threat. Several
Western forces, including those of France, the United Kingdom and the United
States, have gone on land a few times to pursue pirates, but generally, foreign
militaries have avoided Somalia. Whereas the countries bordering the Strait of
Malacca or Gulf of Guinea are able to go on the offensive to root out piracy,
the rest of the world, unable to rely on Somalia, is going on the defensive.
In essence, the commercial
shippers and naval forces have adopted a siege strategy -- they hope to starve
the pirates of resources, forcing them to give up. Somali pirates held about 20
ships at any given time in 2010; they currently hold 11. As the pirates hijack
fewer ships, and as armed guards make piracy more dangerous, the entire
enterprise is looking less lucrative and appealing.
The Bottom Line
Even though the Somali pirates
have not been as successful in 2012 as they were in recent years, their
existence is still making it more expensive to sail around the Horn of Africa.
The problem with the siege strategy is that as soon as shipping companies or
foreign naval forces let up on the pirates, they will go back to hijacking
ships.
The cost of prevention right
now is high. It is impossible to know exactly how many ships are vulnerable to
Somali pirate attacks each year, but we know that about 33,000 commercial ships
pass through the Gulf of Aden yearly. Estimates of how many of those ships
carry armed guards range from 40 to 70 percent. That means that about
13,000-23,000 ships are paying for armed guards to accompany them through the
vulnerable areas, a roughly 10-day trip, at a cost of approximately $60,000
each time. Based on those figures, the total annual cost for shipping companies
merely to deploy armed guards on their ships through the Gulf of Aden is
between about $800 million and $1.4 billion. The total cost of piracy to the
world in 2011, according to the One Earth Future Foundation's estimates, was
between $6.6 billion and $6.9 billion. This estimate included $160 million for
ransom payments; other preventative measures, such as rerouting ships or using
more fuel to maintain higher speeds, made up the rest of the costs.
In other words, the cost of
preventing piracy off the coast of Somalia is substantially higher than the
costs piracy inflicts. Nevertheless, shipping companies are willing to pay a
premium to prevent disruptions in their operations. They would prefer to pay a
small amount for protection on each trip -- even though it adds up -- if it
means averting a hijacking and multimillion-dollar ransom.
Somalia's Future
The key component of the siege
strategy is that it weakens the pirates' control over their land-based
sanctuaries. Their power is connected to their revenue, so the decrease in
revenue will decrease their power. The shipping companies and foreign navies hope
that some other, less disruptive enterprises will eventually take root along
Somalia's pirate-heavy coast.
In the midst of forming its
first permanent government since 1991, Somalia is currently incapable of
addressing its lack of control over the central Somali coast. Instead, it is
focusing on securing the population bases of Mogadishu, Kismayo and other small
towns in south-central Somalia from al Shabaab. This will occupy the government
for at least the next year. Even after that, Mogadishu has little incentive to
try to tighten its control over central coastal pirate towns. The government
has much more to lose if it fails in southern Somalia because it redirected
scarce government resources to take on piracy. The pirate-held areas are
economically depressed and are politically less important. That's why they
started engaging in piracy in the first place.
The only force that has
significantly challenged the pirates on land is the Puntland Maritime Police
Force. Located in northeast Somalia, Puntland is much more stable than the
south and is virtually independent. The Puntland Maritime Police Force had
success in capturing pirates, destroying their staging bases along the beach,
cutting off their supply routes and even, supposedly, attempting to seize hijacked
vessels from the pirates. However, the police force suffered from funding cuts
and political opposition and appears to no longer be active against the
pirates. Although Mogadishu is unable to control much of its territory, the new
government doesn't want regional governments accumulating too much strength. In
the end, a strong Puntland may be more of a risk to Mogadishu than pirates.
Without a sustained,
land-based intervention, Somali piracy will continue -- even if it is at a
lower rate -- at least until some other criminal enterprise takes its place.
But even at its lower rate, as long as Somali pirates are operating, they will
be an expensive burden for the world's shipping industry.
Ben West, November 08, 2012
"The Expensive, Diminishing Threat of Somali Piracy is republished with
permission of Stratfor."
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