Is al-Qaeda on offense, or are
thugs in Africa just trading on terrorism’s best-known brand?
Fareed Zakaria
The recent terrorist attack at
a natural gas plant in Algeria--which, together with the counterstrike by
Algiers, left 38 hostages and 29 militants dead--has aroused fears that we are
watching the resurrection of al-Qaeda, no longer just in Southwest Asia but in
virtually every corner of Africa as well. British Prime Minister David Cameron
reacted to the events in a way that evoked the days after 9/11. "This is a
global threat, and it will require a global response," he said. "It
wants to destroy our way of life. It believes in killing as many people as it
can."
There's little doubt that the
Algerian terrorists are brutal, nasty people, but many questions about them
remain. Are they a branch of al-Qaeda? Do they have global jihadist aims? Do
they seek to destroy our way of life? It's vitally important that we understand
these groups so that our response to them is tailored to the facts.
Illustration by Oliver Munday
for TIME
|
The Algerian group responsible for the attack, al-Mulathameen
Brigade, which translates as "the brigade of the masked ones," is led
by Moktar Belmoktar, who has been fighting the Algerian government for two
decades. He claims to be a veteran of the war against Soviet forces in
Afghanistan, but he came to prominence in Algeria in the 1990s. That's when the
nation's Islamic political parties were poised to win parliamentary elections.
But in 1992, the Algerian army canceled the elections, banned the Islamist
parties and began a brutal offensive against the radical and violent wings of
the Islamist groups.
Accounts vary as to whether
closer to 150,000 or 200,000 people were killed in this counterterrorist
campaign, but everyone agrees that both the insurgents and the army showed no
mercy and observed no boundaries. The most extreme groups that survived
continued to battle the Algerian state but never espoused larger goals. In
fact, they were careful never to blow up oil pipelines--though there are
thousands of miles of exposed pipelines in oil-rich Algeria--because they
wanted to replace the government, not destroy the world.
It is these groups that a few
years ago morphed into al-Qaeda in Islamic Northwest Africa. They have survived
not because of any ideological support from the population but rather because,
some believe, they have managed to raise plenty of money by engaging in
thoroughly un-Islamic activities like smuggling drugs and tobacco. (Belmoktar
is nicknamed the Marlboro Man for that reason.) In recent years, it seems they
have stumbled upon a far more lucrative business: hostage taking. Belmoktar and
groups like his in Algeria and Mali have kidnapped Westerners and extracted
rich ransoms in return. The going rate for a Western hostage in 2011 was $5.4
million. This sort of terrorism pays richly in this world, not the next.
The Algerian terrorist attack
was supposedly a response to France's military intervention in Mali and a show
of support for one of Belmoktar's associates, Iyad Ag Ghaly. Mali's terrorism
is also worth understanding. Nine months ago, an Islamic group, Ansar Dine,
seized control of the northern sections of Mali, where it has imposed Shari'a.
The group is led by Ghaly, a larger-than-life figure who has spent many years
fighting not for Islam but for the rights of his ethnic group, the Tuaregs.
Throughout this period he tussled with the central government in Mali but also
negotiated amicably with it. His takeover of the north came in response to a
coup in Mali that replaced a democratic government with a harsh dictatorship.
In addition, Mali's central state and army are in slow-motion collapse. Through
it all, Ghaly has reportedly made millions through drug and weapon smuggling.
What conclusions can we draw from all this? These groups are
largely composed of local thugs with long-standing grievances that often have
little to do with global jihad. Also, terrorism is good business for them.
Their causes have lost support at home, so they have latched on to the al-Qaeda
brand in the hope of enhancing their appeal--and, perhaps crucially, gaining
greater global attention. (Keep in mind Osama bin Laden's words in 2004:
"All that we have to do is to send two mujahedin to the furthest point
east to raise a piece of cloth on which is written al-qaeda in order to make the
generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic and political
losses.") To elevate these thugs and smugglers to grand ideological foes
is to play into their hands.
Fareed Zakaria, TIME,
Monday, Feb. 04, 2013
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