George Friedman
Editor's Note: This week, we revisit a
Geopolitical Weekly first published in July 2014 that explored whether Russian
President Vladimir Putin could hold on to power despite his miscalculations in
Ukraine, a topic that returned to prominence with his recent temporary absence from public view. While Putin has since reappeared, the issues highlighted by
his disappearing act persist.
There is a general view that Vladimir Putin
governs the Russian Federation as a dictator, that he has defeated and
intimidated his opponents and that he has marshaled a powerful threat to
surrounding countries. This is a reasonable view, but perhaps it should be
re-evaluated in the context of recent events.
Ukraine and the Bid to Reverse Russia's Decline
Ukraine is, of course, the place to start. The
country is vital to Russia as a buffer against the West and as a route for
delivering energy to Europe, which is the foundation of the Russian economy. On
Jan. 1, Ukraine's president was Viktor Yanukovich, generally regarded as
favorably inclined to Russia. Given the complexity of Ukrainian society and
politics, it would be unreasonable to say Ukraine under him was merely a
Russian puppet. But it is fair to say that under Yanukovich and his supporters,
fundamental Russian interests in Ukraine were secure.
This was extremely important to Putin. Part of
the reason Putin had replaced Boris Yeltsin in 2000 was Yeltsin's performance
during the Kosovo war. Russia was allied with the Serbs and had not wanted NATO
to launch a war against Serbia. Russian wishes were disregarded. The Russian
views simply didn't matter to the West. Still, when the air war failed to force
Belgrade's capitulation, the Russians negotiated a settlement that allowed U.S.
and other NATO troops to enter and administer Kosovo. As part of that
settlement, Russian troops were promised a significant part in peacekeeping in
Kosovo. But the Russians were never allowed to take up that role, and Yeltsin
proved unable to respond to the insult.
Putin also replaced Yeltsin because of the
disastrous state of the Russian economy. Though Russia had always been poor,
there was a pervasive sense that it been a force to be reckoned with in
international affairs. Under Yeltsin, however, Russia had become even poorer
and was now held in contempt in international affairs. Putin had to deal with
both issues. He took a long time before moving to recreate Russian power,
though he said early on that the fall of the Soviet Union had been the greatest
geopolitical disaster of the 20th century. This did not mean he wanted to
resurrect the Soviet Union in its failed form, but rather that he wanted
Russian power to be taken seriously again, and he wanted to protect and enhance
Russian national interests.
The breaking point came in Ukraine during the
Orange Revolution of 2004. Yanukovich was elected president that year under
dubious circumstances, but demonstrators forced him to submit to a second
election. He lost, and a pro-Western government took office. At that time,
Putin accused the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies of having organized
the demonstrations. Fairly publicly, this was the point when Putin became
convinced that the West intended to destroy the Russian Federation, sending it
the way of the Soviet Union. For him, Ukraine's importance to Russia was
self-evident. He therefore believed that the CIA organized the demonstration to
put Russia in a dangerous position, and that the only reason for this was the
overarching desire to cripple or destroy Russia. Following the Kosovo affair,
Putin publicly moved from suspicion to hostility to the West.
The Russians worked from 2004 to 2010 to undo
the Orange Revolution. They worked to rebuild the Russian military, focus their
intelligence apparatus and use whatever economic influence they had to reshape
their relationship with Ukraine. If they couldn't control Ukraine, they did not
want it to be controlled by the United States and Europe. This was, of course,
not their only international interest, but it was the pivotal one.
Russia's invasion of Georgia had more to do
with Ukraine than it had to do with the Caucasus. At the time, the United
States was still bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan. While Washington had no
formal obligation to Georgia, there were close ties and implicit guarantees.
The invasion of Georgia was designed to do two things. The first was to show
the region that the Russian military, which had been in shambles in 2000, was
able to act decisively in 2008. The second was to demonstrate to the region,
and particularly to Kiev, that American guarantees, explicit or implicit, had
no value. In 2010, Yanukovich was elected president of Ukraine, reversing the
Orange Revolution and limiting Western influence in the country.
Recognizing the rift that was developing with
Russia and the general trend against the United States in the region, the Obama
administration tried to recreate older models of relationships when Hillary
Clinton presented Putin with a "restart" button in 2009. But
Washington wanted to restore the relationship in place during what Putin
regarded as the "bad old days." He naturally had no interest in such
a restart. Instead, he saw the United States as having adopted a defensive
posture, and he intended to exploit his advantage.
One place he did so was in Europe, using EU
dependence on Russian energy to grow closer to the Continent, particularly
Germany. But his high point came during the Syrian affair, when the Obama
administration threatened airstrikes after Damascus used chemical weapons only
to back off from its threat. The Russians aggressively opposed Obama's move,
proposing a process of negotiations instead. The Russians emerged from the
crisis appearing decisive and capable, the United States indecisive and
feckless. Russian power accordingly appeared on the rise, and in spite of a
weakening economy, this boosted Putin's standing.
The Tide Turns Against Putin
Events in Ukraine this year, by contrast, have
proved devastating to Putin. In January, Russia dominated Ukraine. By February,
Yanukovich had fled the country and a pro-Western government had taken power.
The general uprising against Kiev that Putin had been expecting in eastern
Ukraine after Yanukovich's ouster never happened. Meanwhile, the Kiev
government, with Western advisers, implanted itself more firmly. By July, the
Russians controlled only small parts of Ukraine. These included Crimea, where
the Russians had always held overwhelming military force by virtue of treaty,
and a triangle of territory from Donetsk to Luhansk to Severodonetsk, where a
small number of insurgents apparently supported by Russian special operations
forces controlled a dozen or so towns.
If no Ukrainian uprising occurred, Putin's
strategy was to allow the government in Kiev to unravel of its own accord and
to split the United States from Europe by exploiting Russia's strong trade and
energy ties with the Continent. And this is where the crash of the Malaysia
Airlines jet is crucial. If it turns out — as appears to be the case — that
Russia supplied air defense systems to the separatists and sent crews to man
them (since operating those systems requires extensive training), Russia could
be held responsible for shooting down the plane. And this means Moscow's
ability to divide the Europeans from the Americans would decline. Putin then
moves from being an effective, sophisticated ruler who ruthlessly uses power to
being a dangerous incompetent supporting a hopeless insurrection with wholly
inappropriate weapons. And the West, no matter how opposed some countries might
be to a split with Putin, must come to grips with how effective and rational he
really is.
Meanwhile, Putin must consider the fate of his
predecessors. Nikita Khrushchev returned from vacation in October 1964 to find
himself replaced by his protege, Leonid Brezhnev, and facing charges of, among
other things, "harebrained scheming." Khrushchev had recently been
humiliated in the Cuban missile crisis. This plus his failure to move the
economy forward after about a decade in power saw his closest colleagues
"retire" him. A massive setback in foreign affairs and economic
failures had resulted in an apparently unassailable figure being deposed.
Russia's economic situation is nowhere near as
catastrophic as it was under Khrushchev or Yeltsin, but it has deteriorated
substantially recently, and perhaps more important, has failed to meet
expectations. After recovering from the 2008 crisis, Russia has seen several
years of declining gross domestic product growth rates, and its central bank is
forecasting zero growth this year. Given current pressures, we would guess the
Russian economy will slide into recession sometime in 2014. The debt levels of
regional governments have doubled in the past four years, and several regions
are close to bankruptcy. Moreover, some metals and mining firms are facing
bankruptcy. The Ukrainian crisis has made things worse. Capital flight from
Russia in the first six months stood at $76 billion, compared to $63 billion
for all of 2013. Foreign direct investment fell 50 percent in the first half of
2014 compared to the same period in 2013. And all this happened in spite of oil
prices remaining higher than $100 per barrel.
Putin's popularity at home soared after the
successful Sochi Winter Olympics and after the Western media made him look like
the aggressor in Crimea. He has, after all, built his reputation on being tough
and aggressive. But as the reality of the situation in Ukraine becomes more
obvious, the great victory will be seen as covering a retreat coming at a time
of serious economic problems. For many leaders, the events in Ukraine would not
represent such an immense challenge. But Putin has built his image on a tough
foreign policy, and the economy meant his ratings were not very high before
Ukraine.
Imagining Russia After Putin
In the sort of regime that Putin has helped
craft, the democratic process may not be the key to understanding what will
happen next. Putin has restored Soviet elements to the structure of the
government, even using the term "Politburo" for his inner Cabinets.
These are all men of his choosing, of course, and so one might assume they
would be loyal to him. But in the Soviet-style Politburo, close colleagues were
frequently the most feared.
The Politburo model is designed for a leader to
build coalitions among factions. Putin has been very good at doing that, but
then he has been very successful at all the things he has done until now. His
ability to hold things together declines as trust in his abilities declines and
various factions concerned about the consequences of remaining closely tied to
a failing leader start to maneuver. Like Khrushchev, who was failing in
economic and foreign policy, Putin could have his colleagues remove him.
It is difficult to know how a succession crisis
would play out, given that the constitutional process of succession exists
alongside the informal government Putin has created. From a democratic standpoint,
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin are as popular
as Putin is, and I suspect they both will become more popular in time. In a
Soviet-style struggle, Chief of Staff Sergei Ivanov and Security Council Chief
Nicolai Patryushev would be possible contenders. But there are others. Who,
after all, expected the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev?
Ultimately, politicians who miscalculate and
mismanage tend not to survive. Putin miscalculated in Ukraine, failing to
anticipate the fall of an ally, failing to respond effectively and then
stumbling badly in trying to recoup. His management of the economy has not been
exemplary of late either, to say the least. He has colleagues who believe they
could do a better job, and now there are important people in Europe who would
be glad to see him go. He must reverse this tide rapidly, or he may be
replaced.
Putin is far from finished. But he has governed
for 14 years counting the time Dmitri Medvedev was officially in charge, and
that is a long time. He may well regain his footing, but as things stand at the
moment, I would expect quiet thoughts to be stirring in his colleagues' minds.
Putin himself must be re-examining his options daily. Retreating in the face of
the West and accepting the status quo in Ukraine would be difficult, given that
the Kosovo issue that helped propel him to power and given what he has said
about Ukraine over the years. But the current situation cannot sustain itself.
The wild card in this situation is that if Putin finds himself in serious
political trouble, he might become more rather than less aggressive. Whether
Putin is in real trouble is not something I can be certain of, but too many
things have gone wrong for him lately for me not to consider the possibility. And
as in any political crisis, more and more extreme options are contemplated if
the situation deteriorates.
Those who think that Putin is both the most
repressive and aggressive Russian leader imaginable should bear in mind that
this is far from the case. Lenin, for example, was fearsome. But Stalin was
much worse. There may similarly come a time when the world looks at the Putin
era as a time of liberality. For if the struggle by Putin to survive, and by
his challengers to displace him, becomes more intense, the willingness of all
to become more brutal might well increase.
George Friedman, Geopolitical Weekly, Stratfor,
March 17, 2015
"Can Putin
Survive? is republished with permission of Stratfor."
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