Korybko To Multipolarra: A Little Bit About Myself, Alt-Media, & Multipolarity

Andrew Korybko

This is the English-language version of the interview that I recently gave to Swiss-based French-language Alt-Media outlet Multipolarra

Can you briefly introduce yourself to our readers? Who are you, what is your background, and what topics are you particularly interested in at the moment?

I’m a Moscow-based American political analyst who specializes in the global systemic transition to multipolarity. I was raised by my maternal grandparents, who are WWII refugees from Slovenia. My grandmother is a Gottscheer, a Germanic subgroup that lived in Slovenia for around 700 years before having to flee after WWII, while my grandfather was half-Gottscheer and half-Slovenian. My dad is a Pole from Krakow while my paternal great-grandfather was a Pole from Kamieniec Podolski (today’s Ukraine).

I’ve always been interested in Russia since my patrilineal line is descended from “Old (‘Kievan’) Rus”. Neither my maternal grandparents who raised me nor my Polish dad hated Russia. To the contrary, they always encouraged me to learn more about it. I therefore studied International Relations (with a specialization in Eastern Europe), International Relations & Diplomacy, and Russian during my undergrad and then moved to Moscow in 2013 to get my Master’s in International Relations at MGIMO.

That’s the Russian abbreviation for the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, which is run by the Foreign Ministry. While still studying, I worked at the Voice of Russia, which merged with RIA Novosti to become Sputnik. I then continued working at Sputnik until 2019 when I left to get my PhD in Political Science at MGIMO, which I finally received in 2023. My dissertation was on Russian-Pakistani relations, while my Master’s was on Hybrid Warfare, but my interests are global.

I nowadays focus a lot on Russia, but my other interests include South Asia, the South Caucasus, and the Horn of Africa. That’s not to say that I neglect other regions, actually I write about them all from time to time, but those are the ones that I spend the most time on. I’m also interested in West Asia too. I aspire to analyze international Relations as accurately as I can, and although that’s impossible to always do so in practice, I nevertheless do my best and thus correct my analyses when need be.

On your Substack blog, you share insightful analyses on various geopolitical topics quickly. How do you manage to be so efficient?

I’ve been doing political analysis since late 2013, when I first started writing for Oriental Review, which was regrettably hacked a year ago and lost most of its archives. I then started working with Voice of Russia in early 2014, which gave me hands-on experience in the field. Between those two and my MGIMO studies, I also contributed to some leading think tanks here, specifically the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and the Valdai Club. I befriended some diplomats over the years too.

To be clear, my work is entirely my own, not influenced by the contacts that I’ve obtained. Unlike some, I don’t pass off other’s ideas as my own. Actually, there have been times when some of my contacts disagreed with and even vehemently disliked my analyses, but I never changed them for that reason. The only times that I change my views are because of new information or insight as happened with South and West Asia for example. By producing analyses for so long, it eventually became second nature.

This led to me forming my own models, whether of International Relations as a whole, regional processes, or certain countries’ foreign policies and policymaking dynamics. I’ve also been publishing original analyses daily since the SMO began, first at the now-defunct One World and then at my Substack. On each one-year anniversary, I reflected on what I learned, which can be read here, here, and here. I’ve thus been working for over 1,260 consecutive days, all out of solidarity with Russia and multipolarity.

Seven years ago, I published a piece at Global Research (a Canadian-based think tank and analysis aggregator) titled “Political Analysis in Today’s Interconnected Globalized Society: Seven Steps”, which aimed to help others follow in my footsteps if they’re so inclined. The seven steps that I enunciated are still relevant to this day and I strongly suggest that interested readers seriously consider applying them. Having said that, this industry can be ruthless, so it’s best to be emotionally prepared.

What I mean by this is that others might notice, like I did, that some of our “peers” don’t aspire to analyze International Relations as accurately as possible. Rather, many are either ideologues who want to push an ideology or opportunists who want clout and/or to solicit donations. You can tell which folks this refers to by them never recalibrating their analyses in light of new information. Instead, they’ll either cling to their narrative or suddenly change it without accounting for why they nowadays think differently.

Another characteristic of these folks is their reliance on “5D chess master plan” conspiracy theories in that they’ll sometimes claim that “politically inconvenient” facts are just Putin or whoever “psyching out” someone else. A lot of them still maintain to this day that he’s an anti-Zionist who’s secretly allied with Iran against Israel despite all the evidence to the contrary, some of which I collected here in 2018, which is a collection of his quotes about Israel from the official Kremlin website.

These “peers” of ours are usually inclined to viciously “cancel” those like us who produce work that discredits their dogma, sometimes going as far as to accuse us being “spies” (it happens to me several times a year, including from so-called “influential” accounts that were invited to conferences in Russia before). Random members of the Alt-Media Community, which readers can learn more about here from my analysis about it in 2021, can be even more vicious. I’ve dealt with a lot, but some folks can’t take it.

That’s why I recommend caution when entering this field since it can indeed be ruthless and not everyone has the emotional and psychological fortitude to deal with it. Of course, if one just parrots the Alt-Media narratives of the day, they don’t have to worry about being “canceled” by their “peers”. Free thinking, however, comes with great risks as explained. I don’t care what people who I’ve never met nor ever will meet think or say about me, however, so it just rolls off my shoulders, but others are different.

The subtitle of your blog is “Geostrategic analysis of the New Cold War.” Can you comment on this?

I expected even before I moved to Russia in 2013, prior to which I lived a year in Krakow to discover my roots (I’m a proud dual Polish citizen) and prepare for enrolling in MGIMO, that another Cold War would emerge. I was therefore vindicated when that happened in early 2014 after EuroMaidan, Crimea’s return to Russia, and what was then only the Donbass Conflict, although I of course wish that Russian-Western tensions could have been averted. It was especially insightful to be enrolled in MGIMO at the time too.

I was able to discuss these developments with my teachers, some of whom are former diplomats, and colleagues. What I learned, however, was that many of the former – my teachers, including former diplomats – thought that everything would eventually blow over. Some of them even told me that I was exaggerating everything and advised me to moderate my analyses. We now know that they were wrong, but I never forgot the impression of important figures here being unprepared for the New Cold War.

This segues into the point that I want to make about Russian foreign policy pre-SMO, Putin, and Russia’s policymaking and policy-influencing class in general. Contrary to what many friends and foes of Russia’s alike might think nowadays, Putin was never some diehard anti-Western revolutionary hellbent on restoring the USSR. As I explained here in early 2022, he’s neither a monster, madman, nor mastermind, but a consummate pragmatist with a lifelong interest in improving Russian-Western relations.

This in turn influenced the abovementioned class and Russian foreign policy in general, hence the many experiences that I had of my MGIMO professors (some of whom were former diplomats) and even think tank contacts here downplaying Russian-Western tensions and even denying the existence of the New Cold War pre-SMO. Like Putin up until he authorized the SMO, which was to safeguard Russia’s security interests vis-a-vis Ukraine after diplomacy failed to do so, they thought that everything was manageable.

The notion that the US-led West was steadily encircling Russia, undermining it from within, and ultimately seeking its “Balkanization” was – just like in the West – largely dismissed here as a so-called “conspiracy theory”. Of course, there were some like Professor Dugin and company that took this seriously, but they were always in the minority. Pretty much everyone else of influence here was Western-friendly, if not pro-Western, and couldn’t countenance a breakdown of ties with the West.

To paraphrase the famous saying, “Russians saddle slow but ride fast”, which in this context means that it took them a while to realize what was happening, but they quickly adapted afterwards. Putin repeatedly explained why he didn’t authorize the SMO earlier, even lamenting that he hadn’t done so, and publicly corrected his mistaken perceptions of the West, especially Germany, of which he’s fond. This influenced everyone else below him and now it seems like a lifetime ago that they doubted any of this.

Circling back to the New Cold War, like I earlier mentioned, I foresaw this years ago before I even came to Russia and this was actually one of the reasons why I wanted to be here. It was obvious to me that the US-led West would continue eroding Russia’s security interests until this provoked a crisis and I wanted to be in Russia when that happened. For all its historical faults, I’ve always considered contemporary Russia as the catalyst of multipolarity, which would end unipolarity and therefore make the world fairer.

To be sure, multipolarity isn’t some fantasy scenario where everyone lives in peace and prosperity, but is simply a different way of organizing International Relations, which I maintain is better for the Global Majority than a single country ruling everything. I’m of course fond of Russia due to my ancestral connection to “Old (‘Kievan’) Rus” via my patrilineal line, but I also never shy away from constructively critiquing it, including as regards the SMO like I did in detail here in late 2022.

Most of my “peers” never once constructively critiqued the SMO due to their ulterior interests that I earlier touched upon (generating clout, pushing an ideology, and/or soliciting donations), but I proudly stand by what I wrote because it was with the intent of helping Russia achieve its goals. As I see it, the SMO has been the ultimate catalyst of multipolarity since the paradigm-changing processes that it’s responsible for have forever reshaped International Relations, thus creating a literal new world order.

The US’ quest to maintain, and nowadays restore, its declining unipolar hegemony will remain but it’s less likely to succeed than ever given all that’s happened over the past 3,5 years. This is what I meant by what’s now known as the New Cold War, namely the aforesaid, which I foresaw would inevitably provoke a crisis with Russia that would then change the world. Being here in Russia and contributing to this process through my work, including as an independent strategic consultant, fills me with pride.

 One of Multipolarra's goals is to introduce Western audiences to the other side's point of view, as well as topics that are not necessarily discussed (or are discussed little or poorly) in the West. In your opinion, what phenomena should Western audiences be following closely in the coming months?

The US’ Kissingerian triangulation between Russia and China is the main trend to monitor. Trump wants to reach a deal with one of them in order to then put more pressure on the other. It looks like he’s betting on a trade deal with China right now that could enable him to escalate US involvement in the Ukrainian Conflict with the goal of subordinating Russia. Nevertheless, if he reaches a deal with Russia first, then he might try to more muscularly contain China through the US’ “Pivot (back) to (East) Asia”.

This interview was originally published in French by Multipolarra here.

Andrew Korybko, Substack, August 11, 2025 

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