Andrew Korybko
The fact that Peskov confirmed that Putin could
hypothetically meet with Zelensky under certain conditions is proof of the
Russian leader’s pragmatic desire to end the conflict if the right terms are
reached instead of continuing it as an explicitly declared regime change
campaign.
Zelensky’s term expired over a year ago, after which Putin declared that
the Rada and its Speaker are the only legitimate powers in Ukraine per his
reading of its constitution. The issue was then thrown onto the backburner
until recently. The resumption of bilateral Russian-Ukrainian
talks in Istanbul led to Kremlin spokesman Dmitry
Peskov telling reporters
that a meeting between Putin and Zelensky “is possible but only as a result of
the work of the delegations of both sides and reaching specific agreements.”
He cautioned that “a key issue for Moscow remains the question
of who Ukraine would authorize to sign any potential agreements reached by the
negotiators” due to Zelensky’s illegitimacy. A few days later, Director of the
Russian Foreign Ministry’s Legal Department Maxim Musikhin said that
“It is of major importance who signs [documents] because their current ‘leader’
lost domestic, let alone external, legitimacy long ago. Hence, there could be
problems with any agreement signed by such a person.”
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov soon thereafter chimed in as well, saying that “if those whose legitimacy, to put it mildly, does not convince anyone anymore, put their signatures, then their successors may challenge the agreement reached.” He then added that despite Putin deeming Zelensky to be illegitimate, “he emphasized at the same time that we still do not refuse to communicate with him and with his administration in order to agree on the principles of a settlement that suit everyone.”
Pushkov, Musikhin, and Lavrov are right, and the ideal
scenario would be for truly free and fair
elections to be held in Ukraine prior to the signing of any peace documents
with Russia, but Zelensky’s illegitimacy might still not preclude him from
signing them if the terms are agreed to without that happening. The issue of
legitimacy is important but it’s not what observers might think. What matters
most is that both parties, regardless of one side’s illegitimacy, continue to
have reasons to abide by whatever is signed.
As informed by the UN’s eight-decade-long experience,
international law is meaningless without credible enforcement mechanisms and
the political will to use them, including unilaterally if there’s a politicized
deadlock at the Security Council. International law shapes public opinion, but
ultimately, powerful states can create facts on the ground that then become the
new reality around which conflicts are politically settled. This might
essentially become the case with the Ukrainian Conflict as
will now be explained.
Whether Zelensky, the Rada Speaker, or some new Ukrainian
President signs peace documents with Russia, they won’t be worth the paper that
they’re written on if Kiev comes to feel after some time that it doesn’t have a
reason to abide by these agreements just like it came to feel about the Minsk
Accords. It’s here where the Russian and American roles come into play, the
first with regard to retaining a large-scale military force near the frontier
and the second by limiting its military commitment to Kiev.
If Russian forces remain within distance of carrying out various
punitive actions in response to Ukrainian violations while the US makes it
clear that it won’t let Ukraine manipulate it into a conflict with Russia, then
a future peace deal might hold (unless a new US administration flip-flops).
Even if a Ukrainian figure deemed legitimate to Russia were to sign these
agreements, they or their successor could still violate them on any pretext if
they didn’t have the aforesaid reasons to continue abiding by them.
Likewise, if Zelensky capitulated to some of the main concessions that Russia is demanding but insisted that he himself must sign the peace documents, then it can’t be ruled out that Putin the pragmatist might agree instead of continuing the conflict as an explicitly declared regime change campaign. The fact that Peskov confirmed that Putin could hypothetically meet with Zelensky under certain conditions is proof of the Russian leader’s sincere desire to end the conflict if the right terms are reached.
Andrew Korybko, Substack,
May 25, 2025
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