George Friedman
Turkey is re-emerging as a
significant regional power. In some sense, it is in the process of returning to
its position prior to World War I when it was the seat of the Ottoman Empire.
But while the Ottoman parallel has superficial value in understanding the
situation, it fails to take into account changes in how the global system and
the region work. Therefore, to understand Turkish strategy, we need to
understand the circumstances it finds itself in today.
The end of World War I brought
with it the end of the Ottoman Empire and the contraction of Turkish
sovereignty to Asia Minor and a strip of land on the European side of the
Bosporus. That contraction relieved Turkey of the overextended position it had
tried to maintain as an empire stretching from the Arabian Peninsula to the
Balkans. In a practical sense, defeat solved the problem of Turkey's strategic
interests having come to outstrip its power. After World War I, Turkey
realigned its interests to its power. Though the country was much smaller, it
was also much less vulnerable than the Ottoman Empire had been.
The Russia Problem
At the same time, a single
thread connected both periods: the fear of Russia. For its part, Russia
suffered from a major strategic vulnerability. Each of its ports -- St.
Petersburg, Vladivostok, Murmansk and Odessa -- was accessible only through
straits controlled by potentially hostile powers. The British blocked the
various Danish straits, the Japanese blocked access to Vladivostok and the
Turks blocked access to the Mediterranean. Russian national policy had an
ongoing focus of gaining control of the Bosporus both to prevent a blockade and
to project power into the Mediterranean.
Therefore, the Russians had a
particular interest in reshaping Turkish sovereignty. In World War I, the
Ottomans aligned with the Germans, who were fighting the Russians. In the
inter-war and World War II periods, when the Soviets were weak or distracted,
Turkey remained neutral until February 1945, when it declared war on the Axis.
After the war, when the Soviets were powerful and attempted covert operations
to subvert both Turkey and Greece, the Turks became closely allied with the
United States and joined NATO (despite their distance from the North Atlantic).
From 1945 until 1991 Turkey
was locked into a relationship with the United States. The United States was
pursuing a strategy of containing the Soviet Union on a line running from
Norway to Pakistan. Turkey was a key element because of its control of the
Bosporus, but also because a pro-Soviet Turkey would open the door to direct
Soviet pressure on Iran, Iraq and Syria. A Soviet-allied or Soviet-influenced
Turkey would have broken the center of the American containment system,
changing the balance of power. Along with Germany, Turkey was the pivot point
of U.S. and NATO strategy.
From a Turkish point of view,
there was no other option. The Soviets had emerged from World War II in an
extremely powerful position. Western Europe was a shambles, China had become
communist and the surplus military capability of the Soviets, in spite of the
massive damage they had endured in the war, outstripped the ability of nations
on their periphery -- including Turkey -- to resist. Given the importance of
the Bosporus and Asia Minor to the Soviets, Turkey was of fundamental interest.
Unable to deal with the Soviets alone, Turkey thus moved into an extremely
tight, mutually beneficial relationship with the United States.
During the Cold War, Turkey
was a strategic imperative of the United States. It faced the Soviets to the
north and two Soviet clients, Syria and Iraq, to the south. Israel drew Syria
away from Turkey. But this strategic logic dissolved in 1991 with the fall of
the Soviet Union. By then, the union had fragmented. Russian power withdrew
from the southern Caucasus and Balkans and uprisings in the northern Caucasus
tied the Russian military down. Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan gained
independence. Ukraine also became independent, making the status of the Russian
Black Sea Fleet in Crimea unclear. For the first time since the early years of
the Soviet Union, Turkey was freed from its fear of Russia. The defining
element of Turkish foreign policy was gone, and with it, Turkish dependence on
the United States.
The Post-Soviet Shift
It took a while for the Turks
and Americans to recognize the shift. Strategic relationships tend to stay in
place, as much from inertia as intention, after the strategic environment that
formed them disappears; it often takes a new strategic reality to disturb them.
Thus, Turkey's relationship with the United States remained intact for a time.
Its ongoing attempts to enter the European Union continued. Its relationship
with Israel remained intact even after the American rationale for sponsoring
Turkish-Israeli strategic ties had diminished.
It is much easier to forge a
strategic policy in the face of a clear threat than in the face of an undefined
set of opportunities. For Turkey, opportunities were becoming increasingly
prevalent, but defining how to take advantage of them posed a challenge. For
Turkey, the key breakpoint with the past was 2003 and the U.S. invasion of
Iraq. From Turkey's point of view, the invasion was unnecessary, threatened to
empower Iran, and posed domestic political challenges. For the first time since
World War II, the Turks not only refused to participate in an American
initiative, they also prevented the Americans from using Turkish territory to
launch the invasion.
Turkey had encountered a
situation where its relationship with the United States proved more dangerous
than the threat an alliance with the United States was meant to stave off. And
this proved the turning point in post-Soviet Turkish foreign policy. Once
Turkey decided not to collaborate with the United States -- its core principle
for decades -- its foreign policy could never be the same. Defying the United
States did not cause the sky to fall. In fact, as the war in Iraq proceeded,
the Turks could view themselves as wiser than the Americans on this subject and
the Americans had difficulty arguing back.
That left the Turks free to
consider other relationships. One obvious option was joining with Europe, the
leading powers of which also opposed the American invasion. That commonality,
however, did not suffice to win Turkey EU membership. A host of reasons, from
fear of massive Turkish immigration to Greek hostility, blocked Turkey's
membership bid. Membership in the European Union was not seen in terms of
foreign policy alone; rather, for secularists it symbolized the idea of Turkey
as a European country committed to European values. But the decision on
membership was not Turkey's to make. Ultimately, the European decision to
essentially block Turkey's membership left Turkey with a more dynamic economy
than most of Europe and without liability for Greece's debt.
The failure to integrate with
Europe and the transformation of ties with the United States from an
indispensible relationship to a negotiable (albeit desirable) one finally
forced Turkey to create a post-Cold War strategy. That strategy grew out of
three facts. First, Turkey faced no immediate existential threat, and even
secondary threats were manageable. Second, Turkey was developing rapidly
economically and had the most powerful military in its region. And third,
Turkey was surrounded by increasingly unstable and dangerous neighbors. Iraq
and Syria were both unstable. Iran was increasingly assertive, and a war
between Iran and Israel and/or the United States remained a possibility. The
Caucasus region was quiet, but the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 and
ongoing tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia were still significant factors.
The Balkans had quieted down after the Kosovo war, but the region remained
underdeveloped and potentially unstable. In the past year, North Africa became
unstable, Russia became more assertive and the United States began appearing
more distant and unpredictable.
Three processes define
Turkey's strategy. The first is its rise in relative power. In a region of
destabilizing powers, Turkey's relative strength is increasing, which provides
Ankara with new options. The second is the possible dangers posed to Turkish
interests by the destabilization, which draws Turkey outward, as Ankara seeks
ways to manage the instability. The third is the reality that the United States
is in the process of redefining its role in the region following the Iraq War
and no longer is a stable, predictable force.
The Transitional Stage
Turkey is emerging as a great
power. It has not yet become one for a host of reasons, including limited
institutions for managing regional affairs, a political base that is not yet
prepared to view Turkey as a major power or support regional interventions, and
a region that is not yet prepared to view Turkey as a beneficial, stabilizing
force. Many steps are required for any power to emerge as a dominant regional
force. Turkey is only beginning to take those steps.
At present, Turkish strategy
is in a transitional stage. It is no longer locked into its Cold War posture as
simply part of an alliance system, nor has it built the foundation of a mature
regional policy. It cannot control the region and it cannot simply ignore what
is happening. The Syrian case is instructive. Syria is Turkey's neighbor, and
instability in Syria can affect Turkey. There is no international coalition
prepared to take steps to stabilize Syria. Therefore Ankara has taken a stance
in which it refrains from overt action, but keeps its options open should
matters become intolerable to Turkey.
When we consider the Turkish
periphery as a whole, we see this transitional foreign policy at work, whether
in Iraq or in the Caucasus. With Iran, it avoids simply being part of the
American coalition while refusing simply to champion the Iranian position.
Turkey has not created a regional balance of power, as a mature regional power
would. Rather, it has created a Turkish balance of power in the sense that
Turkish power is balanced between subordination to the United States and
autonomous assertiveness. This period of balancing for an emerging power is
predictable; the United States went through a similar phase between 1900 and
World War I.
Turkey obviously has two main
domestic issues to address as it moves forward. We say "as it moves
forward" because no nation ever solves all of its domestic problems before
it assumes a greater international role. One is the ongoing tension between the
secular and religious elements in its society. This is both a domestic tension
and an occasional foreign policy issue, particularly in the context of radical
Islamists, where every sign of Islamic religiosity can alarm non-Islamic powers
and change their behavior toward Turkey. The other is the Kurdish problem in Turkey,
as manifested by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) militant group.
The first problem is endemic
in most societies these days; it defines American politics as well. It is
something nations live with. The PKK problem, however, is unique. The Kurdish
issue intersects with regional issues. For example, the question of Iraq's
future involves the extent of autonomy enjoyed by Iraq's Kurdish region, which
could have an effect on Turkish Kurds. But the major problem for Turkey is that
so long as the Kurdish issue persists, foreign powers opposed to Turkey's rise
will see the Kurds as a Turkish weakness and could see covert interventions
into the Kurdish regions as an opportunity to undermine Turkish power.
Turkey is already wary of
Syrian and Iranian efforts to constrain Turkey through Kurdish militancy. The
more powerful Turkey gets, the more uncomfortable at least some in the region
will become, and this actually increases Turkey's vulnerability to outside
intervention. Therefore Turkey must address the Kurdish issue, since regional
unrest and separatism fueled by outside enemies could undermine Turkey's power
and reverse its current trend toward becoming a great power.
There is a paradox, which is
that the more powerful a nation becomes, the more vulnerable it might be. The
United States was undoubtedly safer between the Civil War and its intervention
in World War I than any time since. So, too, Turkey was likely safer between
1991 and today than it will be when it becomes a great power. At the same time,
it is unsafe to be simply a junior ally to a global power given to taking risks
with other countries.
The idea of safety among
nations in the long run is illusory. It doesn't last. Turkey's current strategy
is to make it last as long as possible. This means allowing events around it to
take their course on the reasonable assumption that at present, the outcome of
these events doesn't threaten Turkey as much as Turkish intervention would. But
as we have said, this is a transitional policy. The instability to its south,
the rise of an Iranian sphere of influence, a deepening of Russian influence in
the Caucasus and the likelihood that at some point the United States might
change its Middle East policy again and try to draw Turkey into its coalition
-- all of these argue against the transitional becoming permanent.
Turkey is interesting
precisely because it is a place to study the transition of a minor country into
a great power. Great powers are less interesting because their behavior is
generally predictable. But managing a transition to power is enormously more
difficult than exercising power. Transitional power is keeping your balance
when the world around you is in chaos, and the ground beneath you keeps
slipping away.
The stresses this places on a
society and a government are enormous. It brings out every weakness and tests
every strength. And for Turkey, it will be a while before the transition will
lead to a stable platform of power.
George Friedman, Stratfor, April 17,
2012
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