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Turkish protesters gather in
Taksim Square in Istanbul on June 1. Photo: Bulent Kilic/AFP/Getty Images
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Summary
The rapid escalation of
anti-government protests in Turkey in recent days has exposed a number of
long-dormant fault lines in the country's complex political landscape. But even
as the appeal of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's ruling Justice and Development
Party (also known by its Turkish acronym, AKP) is beginning to erode, it will
remain a powerful force in Turkish politics for some time to come, with its
still-significant base of support throughout the country and the lack of a
credible political alternative in the next elections.
Analysis
The foundation for the current
unrest was laid May 28, when a small group of mostly young environmentalists
gathered in Istanbul's Taksim Square for a sit-in to protest a planned
demolition of walls, uprooting of trees and the perceived desecration of
historical sites in the square's Gezi Park. The initially peaceful
demonstration turned violent the night of May 30, when police tried to break up
what had grown to more than 100 protesters.
The environmental protesters
were joined the next day by high-level representatives of the Justice and
Development Party's main opposition, the secular Republican People's Party
(known as CHP). The message of the protests soon evolved from saving Gezi
Park's trees to condemning Erdogan and his party for a litany of complaints.
Anti-government chants included "Down with the dictator,"
"Tayyip, resign," and "Unite against fascism."
The protests grew rapidly when
the weekend began, with more than 10,000 people gathering in Taksim Square on
June 1. Many of these made their way to the square from the district of
Kadikoy, a Republican People's Party stronghold on the Asian side of Istanbul,
by walking across the Bosphorus Bridge banging pots and pans in defiance of
laws against pedestrian use of the bridge. Some reportedly threw Molotov
cocktails, fireworks and stones at police, prompting the use of tear gas and
water cannons on the protesters. However, this quickly drew condemnation,
leading the government to temporarily withdraw police at the cost of allowing
more protesters to gather.
Erdogan's response was
defiant. While admitting excessive force by the police and ordering an
investigation of the matter, he said that he would not give in to "wild
extremists" who belong to an "ideological" as opposed to
"environmental" movement and that he would bring out a million
supporters from his party for every 100,000 protesters. The same night, riots
broke out and some 5,000 protesters threw stones at the prime minister's office
in the Besiktas neighborhood in Istanbul.
On the morning of June 2,
heavy rains kept protesters away from Taksim Square save for a few dozen who
huddled around bonfires. More protesters made their way back to the square in
the afternoon while Erdogan made another defiant speech blaming the Republican
People's Party for the unrest and vowing to proceed with the development plans.
Clashes between police and protesters have resumed, and close to 1,000 people
have been detained and dozens injured.
Erdogan's Limits
The size and scope of the
protests must be kept in perspective. By the end of June 1, protests had
reportedly spread to Izmir, Eskisehir, Mugla, Yalova, Antalya, Bolu, Adana,
Ankara, Kayseri and Konya. Many of the areas where protests were reported are
also areas where the Republican People's Party would be expected to bring out a
large number of supporters. Konya, Kayseri and Ankara, strong sources of
support for the Justice and Development Party, were notable exceptions. The
largest protests, in Istanbul and Izmir, brought out predominantly young
protesters in the tens of thousands. The protests would be highly significant
if they grow to the hundreds of thousands, include a wider demographic and
geographically extend to areas with traditionally strong support for the ruling
party.
The protests so far do not
indicate that Erdogan's party is at serious or imminent risk of losing its grip
on power, but they do reveal limits to the prime minister's political
ambitions. Erdogan is attempting to extract votes from a slow-moving and highly
fragile peace process with the Kurdistan Workers' Party to help him get enough
support for a constitutional referendum. The referendum would transform Turkey
from a parliamentary system to a presidential system and thus enable Erdogan,
whose term as prime minister expires in 2015, to continue leading Turkey as
president beyond 2014, when presidential elections are scheduled. The sight of
protesters from the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (known as the BDP)
joining Republican People's Party supporters for the June 1 protests does not
bode well for Erdogan's plan to rely on those votes in the constitutional
referendum. Though the Justice and Development Party, which remains highly
popular with Turkey's more conservative populace in the Anatolian interior, so
far does not face a credible political contender for the October local
elections or 2015 parliamentary elections, Erdogan's political maneuvering to
become president will face more resistance.
The ruling party's main
secular opposition is alarmed at Erdogan's policies that compromise the core
founding principles of the state as defined by Kemal Ataturk. From social
measures that ban the sale of alcohol after 10 p.m. to foreign policy measures
that have Turkey trying to mold and influence Islamist rebel groups in Syria,
these are policies that directly undermine the Ataturkian mandate that Turkey
must remain secular and avoid overextending itself beyond the republic's
borders. But the growing dissent against the party is not a simple
Islamist-secular divide, either. A perception has developed among a growing
number of Turks that the party is pursuing an aggressive form of capitalism
that defies environmental considerations as well as Islamic values. Within
business circles, frustration is building over the number of concessions handed
out to Erdogan's closest allies.
Rising Dissent
The polarization of the state
could be plainly seen in the reporting of the Gezi Park protests. The protests
appear to have emboldened once critical newspapers such as Hurriyet to reassume
an anti-ruling party stance unseen in the recent years of Erdogan's media
taming. Hurriyet has broadcast Erdogan's "defeat" with headlines such
as "Erdogan no longer almighty." On the other end of the political
spectrum, the state-funded news agency Anatolia is reporting the protests as a
"brawl" between police and firework-throwing youth extremists, while
stressing a democratic message that the government permitted the Republican
People's Party to demonstrate in Taksim.
Far more interesting is
reporting from the Justice and Development Party's traditional sources of
support. Yeni Safak, a newspaper close to the ruling party, has condemned the
park project and sympathized with the protesters. The same was seen in Zaman
newspaper, run by followers of the moderate Islamist Gulen movement. The
Gulenists form a crucial component of the ruling party's broader support base
but also keep their distance from the ruling party. The movement has been
increasingly critical of Erdogan, strongly suggesting that he and his party
have become too powerful. Editorials from the newspaper admonished Erdogan for
his "excessive" behavior and sided with the protesters.
Though dissent is rising,
Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party still have a substantial support
base, and the opposition continues to lack a credible political alternative
(local elections scheduled for October likely will indicate how much support
for the party has waned). At the same time, Turkey is pursuing a highly ambitious
agenda abroad, from negotiating peace with Kurdish militants and developing oil
pipelines in Iraqi Kurdistan to trying to fend off Syrian-backed militant
attacks. Turkey was already highly constrained in pursuing these foreign policy
goals, but they will take second place to Turkey's growing political
distractions at home as Erdogan prioritizes the growing domestic challenges and
as foreign adversaries such as Syria try to take advantage of preoccupied
Turkish security forces to try to sponsor more attacks inside Turkey.
"Turkey's Violent Protests in Context is republished with permission of
Stratfor."
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