Operation "Uncle Joe": U.S. Influence in Brazil’s 2022 Election

How Washington Helped Build the Institutional Shield That Paved the Way for Lula’s Victory

David Agape

There was significant foreign interference in Brazil’s 2022 presidential election — the most consequential since the country’s return to democracy in the late 1980s. But it didn’t come from the so-called "Bolsonarist" camp. Instead, it came from the organized left, a network of NGOs funded by international foundations, a judiciary increasingly aligned with political causes, and segments of the press committed to one outcome: Lula’s victory. What was framed as a “defense of democracy” was, in practice, a coordinated effort to externally manage the country’s electoral process.

Brazilian journalist Cláudio Dantas aptly coined this arrangement “Operation Uncle Joe” — a reference to Operation Brother Sam, the U.S. military mission in 1964 intended to support the coup that deposed Brazilian President João Goulart. Back then, U.S. Navy ships approached the Brazilian coast, signaling their readiness to ensure regime change. The move was enough to intimidate opponents and secure the military’s success. In 2022, the role of Uncle Sam was far more subtle — and arguably more effective. High-level diplomatic visits, official statements praising Brazilian institutions, and synchronized campaigns by NGOs funded by international billionaires created a new and more refined form of political pressure.

Ironically, the same arguments once used in 1964 to justify a “preventive countercoup” by the military are now repeated by defenders of judicial censorship. The political left, which for decades condemned U.S. interference in Latin America, now defends it — as long as it's used against their opponents. But there’s a key difference. In 1964, there was a real threat of armed conflict: Soviet influence, guerrilla groups trained by Cuba, and violent uprisings across the region. The fear, although perhaps exaggerated, had some grounding — even if it didn’t justify U.S. intervention. In 2022, that fear was fabricated. There were no tanks or revolutions — just protests, criticism, and memes. Even so, the narrative of an institutional emergency was used to justify censorship, political persecution, and arbitrary arrests.

As I revealed in my reporting on the Censorship-Industrial Complex — a global alliance of governments, tech companies, and NGOs that control online discourse — the United States wasn’t just a passive observer of Brazil’s internal political crackdown. It played an active role. The irony is that this very model was born in the U.S., out of panic over alleged Russian interference in the 2016 election. The issue for Washington was never interference itself — but who was doing the interfering.

Brazil once again became a pawn on the geopolitical chessboard.

The Pressure Came from Abroad

While Operation Brother Sam was only revealed over a decade later through declassified U.S. documents, this new version was unveiled in an unusual way. On May 13, 2025, during an international event in New York, Brazil’s current Supreme Court Chief Justice, Luís Roberto Barroso, made a surprisingly candid admission:

“I went to the United States to ask for help in containing the ‘authoritarian wave’ in Brazil.”

The statement was delivered without hesitation during Brazil Week, an event hosted by the LIDE Group — a business and political organization founded by João Doria, a former governor of São Paulo — in front of an audience of diplomats, business leaders, and politicians. Like many similar events, it was held far from the Brazilian public, under the guise of discussing the country's future. Barroso explained that while presiding over Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court (TSE), he met at least three times U.S. diplomats in Brasília, asking for public statements of support from the U.S. government regarding Brazil’s electoral system. “I believe it had an effect,” Barroso said, “because Brazilian military officers don’t like to antagonize the U.S., since that’s where they get their training and equipment.”

It was a rare moment of frankness — an open admission of international coordination in Brazil’s institutional shielding ahead of the 2022 election.

This wasn’t Barroso’s first “overshare.” He had previously made public comments revealing the judiciary’s political leanings:

·         “You lost, sucker, now stop bothering us” — said to a Bolsonaro supporter in New York.

·         “We defeated Bolsonarism” — declared at the UNE Congress (a left-wing student union) in July 2023, after Lula’s election.

·         “You don’t win elections, you take them” — a phrase he later claimed was quoted out of context and attributed to others.

In an article published on his website, journalist Cláudio Dantas pointed out that Barroso let slip at least two key details while publicly discussing his coordination with U.S. officials during the 2022 election. First, he inadvertently revealed the identity of his U.S. diplomatic contact — later identified by Dantas as Douglas Koneff, then Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Brasília. Second, and more tellingly, Barroso nearly repeated verbatim a quote from a 2022 Financial Times article. The British outlet had cited an anonymous “high-ranking Brazilian official” who described a “discreet campaign” by the White House to ensure that Brazil would respect the election results.

The anonymous source told the FT:

“The U.S. statement was very important, especially for the military. They receive equipment and training from the U.S., so maintaining good relations is important.”

Barroso repeated that line almost verbatim, arguing that U.S. diplomacy “may have played a role” in stabilizing the situation, since Brazilian military officers “don’t like to cross the U.S.”

For Dantas, the resemblance is revealing. Either Barroso internalized the quote and began repeating it as a kind of political mantra — or he was the anonymous source quoted by the Financial Times. If the latter, the then-president of Brazil’s electoral court was not just an election official, but also a behind-the-scenes diplomat, shaping the international narrative that Bolsonaro was preparing a coup.

The timeline supports this theory. Koneff was the same U.S. diplomat who attended a July 18, 2022 meeting between then-president Jair Bolsonaro and dozens of foreign ambassadors at the Palácio da Alvorada, Brazil’s presidential residence. There, Bolsonaro criticized Brazil’s electronic voting system and questioned the neutrality of the TSE and its judges — a speech that would later be used to justify his electoral disqualification.

The very next day, the U.S. Embassy in Brasília — under Koneff’s direction — issued a public statement reaffirming “confidence in Brazil’s democratic institutions” and praising the country's electoral system as a global model. The note read:

“Brazil’s elections, conducted and tested over time by its electoral system and democratic institutions, serve as a model for nations in the hemisphere and around the world. We are confident that the 2022 elections will reflect the will of the electorate.”

The statement was widely covered by Brazilian and international media. It was interpreted as a diplomatic blow to Bolsonaro’s claims and a show of public support for the TSE, then overseen by Justice Alexandre de Moraes. Today, we know — thanks to Barroso’s own words — that the statement was not spontaneous: it had been directly requested by him during prior meetings with Koneff.

Instead of safeguarding national sovereignty, Barroso admitted to seeking the political support of a foreign power to neutralize a domestic rival — all in the name of “defending democracy.” His remarks shattered any illusion of institutional neutrality. They exposed the Supreme Court — under both Barroso and Moraes — as active participants in a transnational coalition. That coalition involved international foundations, digital platforms, think tanks, and diplomats — all working to isolate Bolsonaro and shield Brazil’s electoral process from any legitimate scrutiny.

Coordinated Diplomatic Outreach

Throughout 2021 and 2022, top officials from the Biden administration made a series of strategic visits to Brazil. Officially, these missions were framed as diplomatic gestures aimed at expressing "confidence in Brazil’s electoral system." But beneath the surface, they carried strong undertones of political surveillance, military signaling, and institutional containment. According to Brazilian journalist Cláudio Dantas, these visits amounted to a not-so-subtle pressure campaign — cloaked in democratic rhetoric, but functioning as part of a broader international operation of psychological influence and institutional discipline.

The first visitor was William Burns, Director of the CIA, who landed in Brasília in July 2021. He met with then-President Jair Bolsonaro and members of his inner circle, including General Augusto Heleno, one of Bolsonaro’s closest military advisors. The trip was covered by the press as a gesture of democratic concern. But, as Dantas pointed out, Burns is not a traditional diplomat. He comes from a background steeped in psychological operations, lawfare, informational manipulation, institutional sabotage, and even support for political insurgency. Burns does not represent the soft-power wing of the U.S. State Department — he represents what is now known as hybrid warfare.

Just a month later, in August 2021, the Biden administration sent two of its top security officials: Jake Sullivan, the U.S. National Security Advisor, and Juan González, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere at the National Security Council. They also met with Bolsonaro, as well as high-ranking Brazilian officials like Walter Braga Netto and Augusto Heleno. While the official agenda focused on environmental and regional security issues, even the U.S. media acknowledged the visit’s real aim: to pressure Bolsonaro over his increasingly rhetoric against Brazil’s electronic voting system. The strategy worked. By the following month, the first public statements from U.S. officials began to emerge, voicing support for Brazil’s electoral institutions — even before any official allegations of fraud or coup plotting had surfaced.

In April 2022, Victoria Nuland, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, visited Brasília alongside Ricardo Zúñiga, then Special Envoy for the Western Hemisphere. They participated in the U.S.–Brazil High-Level Dialogue, a formal diplomatic meeting. But given the political context, their presence suggested a dual agenda. In an interview with CNN, Nuland confirmed that Brazil’s elections were among the topics discussed. She claimed Brazil had "one of the most secure and transparent voting systems in South America."

On June 1, 2022 — just days before the 9th Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles — Juan González again addressed Brazil’s elections in a press briefing. He said the United States had full confidence in Brazil’s democratic institutions, calling them “robust.” He added that the elections were an internal matter but stressed that the U.S. trusted Brazil’s electoral system. Days later, President Joe Biden met with Bolsonaro during the Summit, where they discussed democracy and regional security among other issues.

Soon after, on August 5, 2022 — just weeks before the Brazilian election — U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin visited Brazil. He met with top Brazilian military officials, including Braga Netto, Hamilton Mourão, Augusto Heleno, and Admiral Flávio Rocha. Austin is not a diplomat. He is a hardened military figure, a veteran of the Iraq War. The message was unmistakable: there would be no tolerance for questioning the electoral process. Any dissent could mean instant international isolation.

The climax of this theater came after the events of January 8, 2023, when thousands of pro-Bolsonaro demonstrators stormed federal government buildings in Brasília — an episode quickly framed as a “Brazilian January 6.” U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stepped in to publicly express solidarity with Brazilian Supreme Court Justices Barroso and Alexandre de Moraes, both central to the election oversight. President Joe Biden even called Lula personally to show support, helping cement the international narrative that Brazil had narrowly avoided a coup attempt — inspired, allegedly, by its northern neighbor.

Asymmetry and Hypocrisy

Just days after Bolsonaro’s July 2022 meeting with foreign ambassadors — where he questioned the country’s electronic voting system — a delegation of Brazilian progressive leaders landed in Washington, D.C., for a six-day mission organized by the Washington Brazil Office (WBO). This organization was created specifically to serve as a bridge between Brazil’s progressive movement and the U.S. political establishment. The group included NGO leaders, former members of Workers’ Party (PT) governments, and identity-based activists. They held meetings with officials from the U.S. State Department and prominent Democratic lawmakers such as Jamie Raskin and Bernie Sanders. The entire agenda was kept secret until the meetings took place, reportedly to avoid interference from Brazil’s diplomatic corps, particularly then-ambassador Nestor Forster, a Bolsonaro appointee.

According to journalist João Paulo Charleaux, writing in the magazine Piauí, the goal of the delegation was to convince U.S. officials that Bolsonaro not only intended to disrupt the 2022 election but had the means to do so, including support from the military, police forces, and armed civilians. The message was clear: Brazil could not contain this threat on its own — only strong international pressure could deter Bolsonaro. The group aimed to strengthen the narrative of an impending democratic crisis and increase foreign pressure before the election even began.

After these meetings, public statements of support for Brazil’s electoral institutions from U.S. officials surged, despite the irony that the U.S. does not use the same fully electronic voting system it was now celebrating in Brazil. The State Department, the White House, and Democratic lawmakers issued official declarations, joint letters, and diplomatic notes. The strongest statement came from 39 U.S. congress members, who urged President Joe Biden to make it “unequivocally clear” to Bolsonaro and the Brazilian military that any attempt to subvert democracy would isolate Brazil internationally.

Members of the Brazilian delegation included:

·         Anielle Franco (Marielle Franco Institute);

·         Sheila de Carvalho (Peregum Institute and Grupo Prerrogativas — a left-leaning legal advocacy group),

·         Paulo Abrão (former Justice Secretary under President Dilma Rousseff);

·         Rogério Sottili (Vladimir Herzog Institute), and
Paulo Vannuchi (Arns Human Rights Commission).

Many of them — especially Black and Indigenous women — would go on to hold positions in President Lula’s administration, revealing the tight integration between Brazil’s NGO ecosystem, its unofficial diplomatic channels, and the elected leftist government.

Charleaux described the visit as a “reverse Operation Brother Sam.” This time, it was the Brazilian left asking Washington to intervene preemptively in its domestic politics — the same kind of foreign interference they once decried. In Charleaux’s view, however, the U.S. was now on “the side of democracy.”

Yet when right-wing figures seek similar political engagement in Washington, the institutional and media treatment is radically different. What is hailed as a “defense of democracy” when done by the left is condemned as a “conspiracy against national sovereignty” when coming from the opposition.

In February 2025, Eduardo Bolsonaro, a federal lawmaker from São Paulo (and son of the former president), traveled to the U.S., where he met with Republican politicians and figures close to former President Donald Trump. According to Eduardo, his visit aimed to raise international awareness about political persecution in Brazil, denounce the imprisonment of peaceful January 8 demonstrators (referring to the 2023 protests in Brasília), and push for sanctions against officials responsible for ongoing violations of civil liberties — including Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes.

In response, two left-wing lawmakers — Lindbergh Farias and Rogério Correia, both from the Workers’ Party — filed a criminal petition with the Brazilian Supreme Court, accusing Eduardo of undermining national sovereignty and requesting the seizure of his diplomatic passport. They also called for an investigation into alleged crimes like obstruction of justice and conspiracy against democratic order — despite offering no concrete evidence.

Rather than dismissing the complaint outright, Justice Alexandre de Moraes forwarded it to the Office of the Prosecutor General (PGR). The PGR responded that there were no grounds for investigation or any precautionary measures. Yet the case remained open for weeks — effectively a symbolic suspension, fueling media speculation and being widely circulated by pro-government outlets.

The case was finally dismissed in March 2025, coinciding with the official visit of Pedro Vaca, the OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, who had expressed concern over Brazil’s use of judicial tools to silence political opposition. By then, Eduardo Bolsonaro had already taken a formal leave from Congress and announced he would remain in the U.S., citing institutional persecution and threats to his safety and freedom of speech.

“Moraes claimed I was undermining Brazil’s sovereignty and asked the Prosecutor General about taking my passport. So what about Barroso — now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court — admitting that he asked the Biden administration to intervene in our election? Is that the role of a Supreme Court judge? Of course not. That’s a conspiracy. Grounds for impeachment,” Eduardo wrote on X.

Timeline of official visits

🗓️ 2021

July
William Burns, Director of the CIA, visits Brasília on July 1. He meets with President Jair Bolsonaro and key members of his inner circle, including General Augusto Heleno and General Luiz Eduardo Ramos.

August
Jake Sullivan, U.S. National Security Advisor, and Juan González, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere at the National Security Council, travel to Brazil. They hold meetings with Bolsonaro, Braga Netto (then Minister of Defense), and Augusto Heleno.

🗓️ 2022

April
Victoria Nuland, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, visits Brasília alongside Ricardo Zúñiga, then U.S. Special Envoy for the Western Hemisphere. They attend the U.S.–Brazil High-Level Dialogue.

June 1
Juan González publicly declares the U.S. government’s confidence in Brazil’s electoral system, days before the 9th Summit of the Americas.

August 5
Lloyd Austin, U.S. Secretary of Defense, visits Brazil. He meets with Braga Netto, Vice President Hamilton Mourão, Augusto Heleno, and Admiral Flávio Rocha.

The Role of U.S.-Backed NGOs

Foreign interference in Brazil’s 2022 election was not limited to actions by the U.S. government. A network of NGOs funded by foreign foundations — most of them American — played a direct and strategic role in shaping the electoral landscape.

One of the key initiatives was a large-scale campaign to mobilize young voters. Although promoted under the banner of civic engagement, the real objective was to boost turnout among the age group where Lula enjoyed a significant lead in polling. Many of these younger voters had no memory of Lula’s involvement in the Mensalão and Operation Car Wash (Lava Jato) scandals, and were therefore less resistant to supporting him.

Behind this campaign was Quid, an agency connected to the Activist Caucus of PSOL — a far-left Brazilian political party — with support from NGOs known for receiving foreign funding and promoting progressive causes. Among them was NOSSAS, a nonprofit that claims to “strengthen democracy, social justice, and equality” through digital campaigns and grassroots mobilization. While NOSSAS presents itself as nonpartisan, its entire agenda aligns with left-wing ideology. The organization is backed by wealthy global donors such as the Open Society Foundations, OAK Foundation, Skoll Foundation, Tinker Foundation, Malala Fund, Instituto Avon, among others.

Another major supporter was Girl Up, a feminist organization focused on empowering teenage girls. In Brazil, Girl Up was known for co-leading a campaign to distribute free menstrual products in public schools — a measure presented as a rights issue, but which also served corporate interests. Girl Up was founded by the United Nations Foundation, a U.S.-based nonprofit and strategic partner of the UN. The foundation receives funding from sources including the U.S. government, Johnson & Johnson (a major tampon and sanitary pad manufacturer), the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Nike Foundation, Royal Dutch Shell, and Disney.

The campaign was heavily promoted by Brazilian celebrities such as Anitta, Juliette, Felipe Neto, and even Hollywood actors Mark Ruffalo and Leonardo DiCaprio. The messaging was crafted to look spontaneous and organic, but in reality, it functioned as professionalized political marketing in favor of Lula. According to reporting by Metrópoles, Brazil’s Workers’ Party (PT) spent around R$ 100,000 (approx. US$ 20,000) on similar mobilization strategies explicitly designed to increase votes for Lula.

Soon after, another campaign emerged: Passe Livre pela Democracia ("Free Transit for Democracy"). It had the same aesthetic, the same organizers, and the same underlying goal — but now focused on pressuring mayors and courts to provide free public transportation on election day, allegedly to reduce voter abstention. This effort was coordinated through BONDE, a mobilization platform run by NOSSAS, also used by Sleeping Giants Brasil — a group notorious for targeting conservative media and activists to get them deplatformed and demonetized. Many of the same actors involved in the youth vote campaign also backed this new push.

These efforts were not isolated campaigns. They formed part of a broader, ongoing strategy to flood the public sphere with carefully orchestrated “grassroots” movements — most of them operating through BONDE. Examples include: Cada Voto Conta (“Every Vote Counts”), Marco Temporal Não! (against a legal framework defining Indigenous land rights), Toma Café com Elas (a feminist agenda), SP sem Canudos (an environmental ban on plastic straws), and A Eleição do Ano (election engagement drive). The faces and slogans change, but the infrastructure remains the same: movements marketed as spontaneous, but actually tied to foundations, political parties, and state institutions.

Had Lula lost, the narrative was ready: high abstention among the poor would be cited as evidence to contest the legitimacy of the result. Since he won, the rhetoric was reversed — now the opposition was accused of “sabotaging access to the vote.” In 2023, Silvinei Vasques, then Director of Brazil’s Federal Highway Police (PRF), was arrested on orders from Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes. He was accused of orchestrating police checkpoints in the Northeast on election day, interpreted by authorities as an effort to suppress pro-Lula voters. What had been framed as a measure to protect voting rights was ultimately used as a tool of political retaliation.

Brazil as America’s Censorship Testing Ground

Foreign influence over Brazil’s speech environment didn’t begin with the 2022 election. It started earlier, as Brazil was gradually turned into a testing ground for a new architecture of content moderation, developed in the United States in the aftermath of the Cambridge Analytica scandal and the election of Donald Trump.

As early as 2017, Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court (TSE) held meetings with representatives from the country’s intelligence agency (ABIN), digital platforms, NGOs, and foreign agencies — including the FBI and the U.S. Department of Justice — to discuss strategies for combating so-called disinformation. In one of these meetings, American agents shared their experiences with foreign interference and content takedown mechanisms. The minutes, initially classified, show that discussions already included proposals such as rapid account blocking, AI-based network monitoring, the creation of “trusted site” whitelists, and the categorization of critical content as fake news based on reports by international NGOs like First Draft.

This marked the beginning of an authoritarian ecosystem that, under the pretext of protecting democracy, began to centralize control of information, punish dissent, and restrict freedom of expression. What started as a “fake news prevention” initiative evolved into a permanent state-sponsored surveillance and censorship system.

This environment paved the way for the next stage: direct action by digital platforms. Under growing political and media pressure, these companies began to build preventative narrative-control mechanisms — not alone, but in partnership with activist NGOs, disinformation labs, and aligned governments. This new structure was first deployed in Brazil in July 2018, months before the election of Jair Bolsonaro.

That month, Facebook announced the removal of 196 pages and 87 profiles in Brazil. Among the main targets were pages linked to the Movimento Brasil Livre (MBL) — a libertarian youth movement — and Brasil 200, a pro-market group led by businessman Flávio Rocha, then a presidential hopeful. Pages supporting Bolsonaro and even politically neutral accounts were also taken down.

According to Facebook, these removals were due to violations of its authenticity policy:

“These pages and profiles were part of a coordinated network using fake accounts to conceal their identity and origin, with the intent of spreading division and disinformation.”

No evidence of actual falsehoods was provided, and the timing — just months before a national election — raised serious doubts about the political motives behind the operation.

Two years later, on July 8, 2020, the pattern repeated. Facebook removed 88 digital assets: 35 accounts, 14 pages, 1 group, and 38 Instagram profiles. This time, the targets were directly tied to President Bolsonaro’s inner circle, including official accounts linked to the Presidency, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, Congressman Eduardo Bolsonaro, and other members of the former Social Liberal Party (PSL). Among the key figures was Tercio Arnaud Tomaz, a presidential aide and admin of the page “Bolsonaro Opressor 2.0”, which had nearly 1 million followers.

Both takedown operations were supported by the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), part of the Atlantic Council — a U.S. think tank aligned with NATO and funded by Western governments, multinationals like Chevron, and Facebook itself, which donated U$1 million in 2018. DFRLab had been monitoring Brazil since May 2018, tracking the online spread of claims about voting machine fraud among conservatives.

Using OSINT (open-source intelligence) techniques, DFRLab produced reports, mapped content clusters, and linked accounts — even in the absence of any legal violations. For the 2020 takedown, Facebook released engagement numbers and ad spend data (around U$1,500), while DFRLab published a report on Medium, complete with diagrams linking social media operators to official government offices. Former allies of Bolsonaro — such as Joice Hasselmann, Alexandre Frota, and Heitor Freire — testified before Congress to support the narrative of a supposed “Office of Hate.” The Brazilian Supreme Court, in investigations overseen by Justice Alexandre de Moraes, began using DFRLab reports as the legal foundation for search warrants and raids.

The mainstream Brazilian press quickly adopted this narrative. The opaque and selective criteria behind these takedowns were rarely questioned, even when they targeted only one side of the political spectrum. Transparency was minimal. In 2018, Facebook released the list of removed accounts only after pressure from federal prosecutors in the state of Goiás. No further explanation of the alleged violations was provided.

It’s worth noting: this model did not remain in Brazil. In 2020, DFRLab co-founded the Election Integrity Partnership (EIP) in the U.S., which monitored and intervened in real time during the American presidential election, adopting the same model first used in Brazil — OSINT-based analysis, internal platform data access, silent removals, and alignment with state institutions. Brazil was the prototype.

Since then, a transnational political moderation ecosystem has taken shape — a web of Big Tech companies, “disinfo labs,” fact-checking outlets, legacy media, and Supreme Courts. Institutional ties and cross-funding arrangements among these actors have formed what’s now known as the Censorship-Industrial Complex.

This system claims to defend democracy. But in practice, it enforces selective censorship and facilitates political persecution. Under the guise of combating “disinformation,” it has become a global alliance of tech platforms, international NGOs, and progressive governments, working together to monitor, punish, and silence dissenting voices.

U.S. Funding Behind Brazil’s Censorship Apparatus

In a report co-authored by me for Civilization Works — a think tank founded by investigative journalist Michael Shellenberger — we detailed how the repression of free speech in Brazil has been systematically driven by foreign funding, international expertise, and direct cooperation with Western powers, especially the United States. Brazil became a testing ground for the Censorship-Industrial Complex (CIC) — a global system operating under the guise of “fighting disinformation,” but whose real goal is to suppress dissenting voices and control the flow of digital information.

Among the key funders of this system are:

·         The U.S. Department of State,

·         USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development), and

·         The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) — created in the 1980s to overtly continue the political operations once covertly handled by the CIA.

As NED co-founder Allen Weinstein admitted to the Washington Post in 1991:

“A lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA.”

According to Mike Benz, former State Department official and director of the Foundation for Freedom Online, Brazil was the first country in the world to undergo a live experiment of direct censorship in encrypted platforms. During the 2022 election cycle, under judicial pressure and with support from U.S.-funded NGOs, Telegram was forced by Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes to remove pro-Bolsonaro accounts and content, and implement internal content moderation tools. Meanwhile, WhatsApp, influenced by foreign recommendations, had restricted message forwarding since 2019. For the first time, private messages between friends and family were treated as potential threats to democracy — and subjected to systematic surveillance.

Organizations such as DFRLab, Meedan, the Poynter Institute, Information Futures Lab (IFL), and the Stanford Internet Observatory established a multi-layered moderation network. DFRLab trained personnel at Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court (TSE) and produced reports that were later used by the Supreme Court (STF) to justify judicial actions. Meedan, through its project Confirma 2022, provided tools to insert “fact-checks” directly into private WhatsApp groups, with the support of local “fact-checking” agencies Aos Fatos, Lupa, and Projeto Comprova — all funded by American foundations.

NED and USAID also funded projects like Countering Disinformation and the Design 4 Democracy (D4D) coalition, which includes Brazilian figures aligned with Lula’s government, such as Marco Ruediger, policy director at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV). Ruediger proposed, during internal meetings at the TSE, the creation of a “trusted site list” — a form of state-issued credibility label that would privilege aligned outlets while placing critical or independent media under suspicion.

This censorship ecosystem also extends into academia. The most prominent case is NetLab, a lab at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) led by Rose Marie Santini. Despite branding itself as independent, NetLab became a central actor in targeting critics of Brazil’s Supreme Court and political opposition. Its reports have been used by the Justice Ministry, the Supreme Court, and Senacon (consumer protection agency) as justification for investigations and penalties.

In 2023, for instance, NetLab accused Google of manipulating search algorithms against Brazil’s proposed Fake News Bill — a charge that led to content removals, a Federal Police inquiry, and threats of fines of R$1 million (about US$200,000) per hour. The case was later dropped by Brazil’s Prosecutor General’s Office due to lack of evidence. Between 2023 and 2024, NetLab received over R$8.3 million (around US$1.6 million) from donors like the Open Society Foundations, Ford Foundation, Serrapilheira Institute, and Greenpeace.

Another revealing case is the Instituto Vero, founded by influencer and YouTuber Felipe Neto. The organization received more than R$1 million (approx. US$ 176,000) from Open Society and around US$30,000 from the U.S. Embassy starting in 2023. According to the Twitter Files Brazil, Felipe Neto used his privileged channel with Twitter executives to pressure the platform into censoring political opponents and suppressing narratives that contradicted official pandemic messaging.

Also part of this network is Sleeping Giants Brasil, launched in 2020. Though it presents itself as a “nonpartisan consumer movement,” it exclusively targets right-wing voices. The group received over US$470,000 from the Ford Foundation and Open Society, in addition to R$200,000 (approx. US$40,000) from the Serrapilheira Institute for a vaccine study that was never published.

From Uncle Sam to Comrade Xi

It was an almost perfect arrangement — operating outside national law, popular will, and democratic transparency — but it began to crack with Donald Trump’s return to the political stage. Still, Brazil remains deeply influenced by foreign interests. During a recent official visit to China, President Lula da Silva asked Xi Jinping to send a trusted representative to Brazil to help advise on regulating social media. In an unexpected moment, Brazil’s First Lady, Janja, interrupted the meeting to accuse TikTok — a platform controlled by the Chinese Communist Party — of favoring the far right and spreading disinformation.

The awkwardness was immediate. But beyond the diplomatic blunder, the incident revealed something deeper: the Brazilian government’s explicit desire to adopt a centralized surveillance and narrative-control model — with the endorsement of an authoritarian regime — all under the pretext of defending democracy.

While much of the world is beginning to break away from the Censorship Consensus, Brazil is moving in the opposite direction: deepening ties with authoritarian regimes, embracing repressive measures, and doubling down on a project aimed at total information control.

The only question that remains is: how long will Brazilians tolerate being used as test subjects in a global experiment of social engineering?

David Agape, Substack, mai 19, 2025