Andrew Korybko
American
soft power operations in this new era that’ll likely follow USAID and USAGM’s
far-reaching reforms under Trump 2.0 will be more creative, appealing, and
effective than all that came before
The reality though is that their operations will probably resume
after some time, albeit through what’ll likely be public-private partnerships
abroad instead of purely state-run enterprises inside the US, and only with
like-minded partners that share Trump 2.0’s populist-nationalist worldview. To
elaborate, the $950 million that
the USAGM requested for this year could be put to more effective use funding
foreign experts, influencers, media, etc. who are from the places whose public
the US wants to influence.
That was already happening through USAID, which is also being gutted and transformed as was explained here in early February, so it’ll either return to its original focus on physical development projects or divide information warfare responsibilities with whatever remains of USAGM. In any case, the point is that USAGM’s influence operations and USAID’s more direct meddling ones are expected to be less centralized than before and outsourced to a much greater degree as a result of Trump 2.0’s reforms.
They’ll also be optimized by replacing their ideologically
radical agenda with his team’s much more pragmatic one, which resonates with a
much wider audience, and relying a lot more on informed figures abroad who have
a better sense of the local pulse than DC-based bureaucrats do. The end result
is that American soft power will be less visibly connected to the US, more
effectively fine-tuned for targeted audiences, and promoted by what can be
described as many more “agents of influence” than before.
It's this final point that captures the essence of Trump’s
reforms. As a successful businessman, Trump appreciates the free market, ergo
why he envisages liberating the so-called “marketplace of ideas” from what he
considers to be USAID and USAGM’s overbearing influence. Instead of keeping
that marketplace “unfree” by letting them continue dictating editorial
preferences, he wants to reduce their roles mostly to funding and supervising
like-minded foreign contractors who’ll then function as “agents of influence”.
The problem though is that their host countries could replicate
the US’ FARA like Georgia recently did to identify which broadcasters,
influencers, media, etc. are receiving foreign funding and then obligate them
to inform their audience of this so that they can keep it in mind when
consuming their content. Additional responsibilities could also be mandated to
make such arrangements too onerous for many to agree to, such as regular and
detailed reporting of their activities, thus hamstringing this plan.
It's here where the Georgian precedent is one again relevant
since this example shows how aggressively the US will push back against even
friendly governments that use the US’ own FARA as the model for their
respective foreign agents legislation. Of course, it goes without saying that
such a reaction strongly suggests that America is indeed guilty of intending to
clandestinely fund foreign figures for influencing their societies, but not all
targeted governments are as strong as Georgia’s to resist this pressure.
Moreover, USAID and USAGM’s ties to the CIA can lead to their
successors indirectly funneling money to these same figures to help them evade
scrutiny if they live in countries that have their own version of FARA, which
can occur via crowdfunding as well as ad revenue from US platforms like YouTube
and X. Governments could legislate that crowdfunding sites restrict foreign
donations for their nationals if they want to still operate in their
jurisdiction, however, and produce the names of donors upon court order.
By contrast, cracking down on US funding that might be
indirectly funneled to foreign figures by the CIA via YouTube and X ad revenue
at USAID and/or USAGM’s behest is more difficult, with the only realistic
option being to legally treat all influencers above a certain number of
followers as foreign agents. Under those circumstances, the US might encourage
its “agents of influence” to flee abroad on the pretext that this infringes on
their freedoms, after which they’ll continue producing their content with impunity.
The aforesaid pretext might be sufficient for the targeted
audience not to negatively judge the figures who leave to avoid complying with
their government’s FARA-like legislation, thus ensuring that they still retain
most of their supporters despite living abroad and therefore saving the
influence operation. In that case, it wouldn’t matter if the authorities
requested that YouTube or X ban those figures’ accounts from being accessed
within their jurisdiction since their audience could then just use free VPNs
instead.
By hook or by crook, the US’ “agents of influence” – some of
whom might even operate as such without their knowledge if the CIA indirectly
funnels funds to them via YouTube or X to financially incentivize them to
continue creating their content – are expected to expand their audience and
sway. American soft power operations in this new era that’ll likely follow
USAID and USAGM’s far-reaching reforms under Trump 2.0 will therefore be more
creative, appealing, and effective than all that came before.
Andrew Korybko, Substack, March 17, 2025
France’s Next Quarterly Nuclear Drills Might Become Prestige-Building Exercises With Poland
It’s Time For Trump To Lift Biden’s Sanctions On RT
France, Germany, & Poland Are Competing For Leadership Of Post-Conflict Europe
Korybko To Newsweek: A Russian-US “New Détente” Would Revolutionize International Relations
What A Trump-Putin Detente Means for Russia and Iran's Partnership
Nenhum comentário:
Postar um comentário
Não publicamos comentários de anônimos/desconhecidos.
Por favor, se optar por "Anônimo", escreva o seu nome no final do comentário.
Não use CAIXA ALTA, (Não grite!), isto é, não escreva tudo em maiúsculas, escreva normalmente. Obrigado pela sua participação!
Volte sempre!
Abraços./-