The US Will Struggle To Get Europe To Abide By Putin’s Demand To Stop Arming Ukraine

Andrew Korybko 

A compromise is possible whereby the Europeans are pressured by the US into stockpiling their Ukrainian-destined arms in Poland and Romania for swift shipment across the border if hostilities re-erupt sometime after a ceasefire, armistice, or peace treaty is agreed to

The official Kremlin readout from Putin’s most recent phone call with Trump shared Putin’s demand that “a complete cessation of providing Kiev with foreign military aid and intelligence must become the key condition for preventing an escalation of the conflict and making progress towards its resolution.” Trump’s temporary suspension of such assistance proves that he has the political will to shut it off for good if he gets what he wants from negotiations with Putin, but the Europeans are a different story.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Trump during a Cabinet meeting on Monday before the end of the 12-hour-long Russian-US talks in Riyadh that day that “You’ve [promoted despite] despite impediments from other countries”, which was arguably an allusion to the Europeans’ warmongering. Although deliberately vague, he might very well have been referring to the EU’s and UK’s plans to continue arming Ukraine in spite of Putin’s demand that this cease as one of his most important conditions for peace.

Poland, Romania, and the Black Sea in descending order serve as the entry points for foreign weapons into Ukraine, none of which the US has full control over. It jointly operates the Rzeszow logistics hub in southeastern Poland through which an estimated 90-95% of all weapons to Ukraine pass but this facility can continue functioning even if the US pulls out. The situation is similar with Romania’s newly built “Moldova Highway” for facilitating the shipment of arms from Greek ports to Ukraine.

The US military only jointly operates local port facilities in Alexandroupolis while having no direct influence over the “Moldova Highway”, both of which can also continue functioning without it. As for the Black Sea, the new grain deal that the US is negotiating with Russia could either lead to international checks on cargo for detecting arms trafficking or create a plausible cover for this trade. In any case, just like the preceding two, the point is that others besides the US can rely on this route too.

Trump is unlikely to threaten economic sanctions against nominal NATO allies whose countries continue to arm Ukraine even if his own decides to cut it off for good as part of the series of pragmatic compromises that it’s negotiating with Russia for sustainably ending the conflict. The only scenario in which he might rally Congress to pass another arms package is if Russia significantly expands its ground campaign beyond the regions that it claims as its own as was discussed here.

As long as that doesn’t happen, then the US’ Biden-era aid will soon run out and Ukraine will then be entirely dependent on European aid, but it’s unclear whether that drastic curtailment in aid (also keeping in mind their already greatly depleted stockpiles) would suffice for Russia to cease hostilities. Putin might agree to it as part of the series of pragmatic compromises that he’s negotiating with Trump, or he could still lean on his counterpart to exert more pressure on the Europeans to follow in his footsteps.

Trump’s hands would be tied in the second scenario as was just explained, but he could also lead from the front by suggesting that the Europeans instead stockpile the equipment that they want to send to Ukraine in Poland and Romania per their “security guarantee” commitments to Kiev. These refer to the bilateral pacts clinched last year whereby major countries like the UK, France, Poland, Italy, and the US itself basically agreed to resume their existing level of support for Ukraine if hostilities re-erupt.

Whatever weapons the Europeans might still send to Ukraine wouldn’t compensate for the cut-off of US aid so they’d be transferring their equipment to be destroyed for no purpose other than delaying the inevitable political resolution of the conflict, by which time Russia could even gain more ground. Putin might of course prefer for NATO not to stockpile anything in proximity to Ukraine’s borders for swift shipment across if there’s a continuation war, but Russia can’t control what they do on their territory.

Trump and his team would therefore do well to convey these points to the Europeans in order to facilitate the Ukrainian peace process. Putin might not agree to a ceasefire or armistice so long as the Europeans continue arming Ukraine, which would be futile on their part in any case, while they’d just be wasting their weapons that could otherwise be put to better use if hostilities re-erupt and the US thus restores its prior level of support for Ukraine. This proposed compromise might lead to a breakthrough.

Andrew Korybko, Substack, March 27, 2025 

Anteriores:
Will Russia Expand Its Ground Campaign Into Sumy, Dniepropetrovsk, And/Or Kharkov Regions? 
The US Agency For Global Media’s Dissolution Could Lead To A Revival Of American Soft Power 
France’s Next Quarterly Nuclear Drills Might Become Prestige-Building Exercises With Poland 
It’s Time For Trump To Lift Biden’s Sanctions On RT 
France, Germany, & Poland Are Competing For Leadership Of Post-Conflict Europe 
Korybko To Newsweek: A Russian-US “New Détente” Would Revolutionize International Relations 
What A Trump-Putin Detente Means for Russia and Iran's Partnership Sikorski Told Zakaria What Poland Learned About US Strategy From Its Engagements With Trump 2.0