Andrew Korybko
Poland
might participate in these exercises in order to send a strong anti-Russian
signal, but the extent to which it might pivot towards France and away from the
US will depend in large part on the outcome of its upcoming presidential
election
The Economist published
an article about the options at his disposal, the most realistic of which is to
station nuclear-capable Rafales in Central & Eastern Europe (CEE) and
include some of those countries in its quarterly nuclear air force drills
codenamed “Poker”. According to one of their sources, “In recent days, other
allies (than Italy, which participated once in 2022,) have offered to take
part.” The most obvious candidate is Poland, whose prime minister declared earlier
this month that he wants nukes.
Its outgoing president once again appealed
to the US in his latest interview with the Financial Times last week to host some of its nuclear
weapons but was promptly shot down by
Vice President Vance, who said that he’d be “shocked” if Trump agreed because
it could lead to a “nuclear conflict”. Seeing as how France has been Poland’s
ally since the Napoleonic era, notwithstanding how it hung Poland out to dry
against the Nazis, Poland might now therefore prioritize The Economist’s
proposed French option.
That would be a volte-face if there ever was one since Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Szejna from the ruling liberal-globalist coalition, which opposes the outgoing (and very imperfect) conservative president, responded to last May’s US nuke request with solid points that also hold true for French ones. In his words, “Poland will not become a nuclear power (since it wouldn’t obtain operational control over these weapons), and Russian missiles will be aimed at these facilities (where they’re based).”
Poland might therefore hold off on hosting French nuclear-armed
Rafales, which would in any case be a major decision likely requiring a lot of
negotiations and planning instead of a swift move by both, in favor of
participating in its quarterly “Poker” drills instead. In that event, these
would become prestige-building exercises showcasing the renewed strength of
their historical alliance, which would also likely aim to co-manage CEE between
them as forecasted in one of the scenarios recently shared here.
The prestige element is important since there’s no credible
“Russian threat” to Poland or France to justify including Poland in France’s
“Poker” drills, let alone possibly basing nuclear-armed Rafales there, but
dramatic stunts such as the one described above could rally some Europeans. In
particular, these are the bloc’s liberal-globalist elite who’ve come to believe
their own propaganda about Russia and some of the CEE people with pathological
fears of it, both of whom would fall under joint Franco-Polish influence.
Poland might fall further under French influence too with time,
in which case its opposition to the French-led proposal for a “European Army” – which was
recently endorsed by Zelensky but
was subsequently rebuffed by
Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski – might gradually erode. That would largely
depend on the outcome of May’s presidential election in Poland, however, since
the liberal-globalist candidate might go along with this while the conservative
and populist ones would remain against it.
If the ruling coalition captures the presidency, then greater
French influence over Poland in the event of Poland being invited to
participate in France’s quarterly “Poker” drills and possibly one day hosting
its nuclear-armed Rafales could first see Poland inviting more foreign military
forces onto its territory. This would align with Tusk’s proposal last week for
the EU and NATO to jointly secure Poland’s
eastern border. In line with their preferences, he and his president would
likely prefer EU forces over NATO/US ones.
The conservative and populist opposition (which aren’t one and
the same) prefer the opposite, NATO/US forces over EU ones, so more foreign
forces might ultimately be based in Poland regardless. Nevertheless, the point
is that any “European Army” might establish a major military presence in Poland
if the liberal-globalist candidate becomes president, after which Poland might
pivot towards what might by then be a possibly French-led instead of German-led
EU at the expense of its alliance with America.
About that, Tusk and Sikorski made irresponsible past statements about
Trump such as smearing him as a “Russian agent”, and Secretary of State Rubio
just put Sikorski in his place for
lending false credence to rumors about Musk cutting Ukraine off from Starlink,
so bilateral ties aren’t too good right now. They’ll therefore likely become
even worse if the liberal-globalists assume full control over the government
upon winning the presidency and then make tangible moves to pivot Poland away
from the US.
A new European security architecture is forming as the Ukrainian Conflict approaches
its inevitable end, and among the most significant variables shaping its final
configuration is the relationship between France and Poland, with the outcome
of the latter’s next presidential election influencing these ties. Poland could
hypothetically participate in France’s “Poker” drills under a conservative or
populist president while still remaining closer to the US, but this balance is
unlikely under a liberal-globalist one.
Poland’s closer alignment with either the EU (via France) or the
US might therefore be the most important factor in determining what this
security architecture looks like due to the country’s immense economic and
military weight on Russia’s western frontier. While the expansion of French
influence over Poland might be a given if it begins participating in the
“Poker” drills, which makes sense from its perspective, the next presidential
election will likely decide whether this turns into a full-blown pivot.
Andrew Korybko, Substack,
March 9, 2025
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