The Obama administration's
efforts to counter the threat posed by al Qaeda and the wider jihadist movement
have been a contentious topic in the U.S. presidential race. Political rhetoric
abounds on both sides; administration officials claim that al Qaeda has been
seriously crippled, while some critics of the administration allege that the
group is stronger than ever. As with most political rhetoric, both claims bear
elements of truth, but the truth depends largely on how al Qaeda and jihadism
are defined. Unfortunately, politicians and the media tend to define al Qaeda
loosely and incorrectly.
The
jihadist threat will persist regardless of who is elected president,
so understanding the actors involved is critical. But a true understanding of
those actors requires taxonomical acuity. It seems worthwhile, then, to revisit
Stratfor's definitions of al Qaeda and the wider jihadist movement.
A Network of Networks
Al Qaeda, the group
established by Osama bin Laden and his colleagues, was never very large --
there were never more than a few hundred actual members. We often refer to this
group, now led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, as the al Qaeda core or al Qaeda prime.
While the group's founders trained tens of thousands of men at their camps in
Afghanistan and Sudan, they initially viewed themselves as a vanguard
organization working with kindred groups to facilitate the jihad they believed
was necessary to establish a global Islamic caliphate. Most of the men trained
at al Qaeda camps were members of other organizations or were grassroots
jihadists. The majority of them received basic paramilitary training, and
only a select few were invited to receive additional training in terrorist
tradecraft skills such as surveillance, document forgery and bombmaking. Of
this select group, only a few men were invited to join the al Qaeda core
organization.
Bin Laden envisioned another
purpose for al Qaeda: leading the charge against corrupt rulers in the Muslim
world and against the United States, which he believed supported corrupt Muslim
rulers. Al Qaeda sought to excise the United States from the Muslim world in
much the same way that Hezbollah drove U.S. forces out of Lebanon and Somalia
forced the U.S. withdrawal from Mogadishu.
Al Qaeda became a network of
networks -- a trait demonstrated not only by its training methods but also in
bin Laden's rhetoric. For example, bin Laden's 1998 "World Islamic
Front" statement, which declared jihad against Jews and Crusaders, was
signed by al-Zawahiri (who at the time was leading the Egyptian Islamic Jihad)
and leaders of other groups, including the Egyptian Islamic Group,
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan and the Jihad Movement of Bangladesh.
Following the 9/11 attacks,
the United States applied against the al Qaeda core the full pressure of its
five counterterrorism levers: intelligence, military, law enforcement,
diplomacy and financial sanctions. As a result, many al Qaeda members,
eventually including bin Laden, were captured or killed and their assets were
frozen. Such measures have ensured that the group remains small for operational
security concerns. The remaining members of the group mostly are lying low in
Pakistan near the Afghan border, and their isolation there has severely
degraded their ability to conduct attacks. The al Qaeda core is now relegated
to producing propaganda for guidance and inspiration for other jihadist
elements. Despite the disproportionate amount of media attention given to
statements from al-Zawahiri and Adam Gadahn, the al Qaeda core constitutes only
a very small part of the larger jihadist movement. In fact, it has not
conducted a successful terrorist attack in years.
However, the core group has
not been destroyed. It could regenerate if the United States eased its
pressure, but we believe tha twill be difficult given the loss of the charismatic bin Laden and his
replacement by the irascible al-Zawahiri.
In any case, the jihadist
movement transcends the al Qaeda core. In fact, Stratfor for years published
an annual
forecast of al Qaeda, but beginning in
2009, we intentionally changed the title of the forecast to reflect
the isolation and marginalization of the al Qaeda core and the ascendance of
other jihadist actors. We believed our analysis needed to focus less on the al
Qaeda core and more on the truly active and significant elements of the
jihadist movement, including regional groups that have adopted the al Qaeda
name and the array of grassroots jihadists.
Franchises and Grassroots
An element of the jihadist
movement that is often loosely referred to as al Qaeda is the worldwide network
of local or regional militant groups that have assumed al Qaeda's name or
ideology. In many cases, the relationships between the leadership of these
groups and the al Qaeda core began in the 1980s and 1990s.
Some groups have publicly
claimed allegiance to the al Qaeda core, becoming what we refer to as franchise
groups. These groups include al Qaeda in Iraq, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Even though these franchises bear the al
Qaeda name, they are locally owned and operated. This means that the local
commanders have significant latitude in how closely they follow the guidance
and philosophy of the al Qaeda core.
Some franchise group leaders,
such as AQAP's Nasir al-Wahayshi, maintain strong relationships with the al
Qaeda core and are very closely aligned with the core's philosophy. Other
leaders, such as Abu Musab Abd al-Wadoud of AQIM, are more distanced. In fact,
AQIM has seen severe internal fighting over these doctrinal issues, and several
former leaders of Algeria's Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat left the
group because of this conflict. Further, it is widely believed that the death
of Somali al Qaeda leader Fazul Abdullah Mohammed was arranged by leaders of
Somali jihadist group al Shabaab, which he had criticized sharply.
The last and broadest element
of the global jihadist movement often referred to as al Qaeda is what Stratfor
refers to as grassroots jihadists. These are individuals or small cells of
individuals that are inspired by the al Qaeda core -- or increasingly, by its
franchise groups -- but that may have little or no actual connection to these
groups. Some grassroots jihadists travel to places such as Pakistan or Yemen to
receive training from the franchise groups. Other grassroots militants have no
direct contact with other jihadist elements.
The core, the franchises and
the grassroots jihadists are often interchangeably referred to as al Qaeda, but
there are important differences among these actors that need to be recognized.
Important Distinctions
There are some other important
distinctions that inform our terminology and our analysis. Not
all jihadists are linked to al Qaeda, and not all militant Islamists are
jihadists. Islamists are those who believe society is best governed by Islamic
law, or Sharia. Militant Islamists are those who advocate the use of force to
establish Sharia. Militant Islamists are found in both Islamic sects. Al Qaeda
is a Sunni militant Islamist group, but Hezbollah is a Shiite militant Islamist
group. Moreover, not all militant Muslims are Islamists. Some take up arms for
tribal, territorial, ethnic or nationalistic reasons, or for a combination of
reasons.
In places such as Iraq,
Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya and northern Mali, several militant groups are
fighting foreign forces, their government or each other -- and sometimes all of
the above. Some of these groups are jihadists, some are tribal militias, some
are brigands and smugglers, and others are nationalists. Identifying, sorting
and classifying these groups can be very difficult, and sometimes alliances
shift or overlap. For example, Yemen's southern separatists will sometimes work
with tribal militias or AQAP to fight against the government; other times, they
fight against these would-be allies. We
have seen similar dynamics in northern Mali among groups such as
AQIM, Ansar Dine, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, various
Tuareg groups and other tribal militias in the region.
Taxonomy becomes even more
difficult when a group uses multiple names, or when multiple groups share a
name. Groups adopt different names for discretion, confusion or public
relations purposes. AQAP called itself Ansar al-Shariah during its fight to
take over cities in southern Yemen and to govern the territory. But radical
cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri, who was arrested in the United Kingdom in 2004 and
extradited to the United States in 2012, has long led a movement likewise
called Ansar al-Shariah. Even the Libyan jihadist militia that attacked the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi uses
the same name. But just because these groups share a name, and just because
members or leaders of the groups know each other, does not necessarily mean
that they are chapters of the same group or network of groups, or that they
even subscribe to the same ideology.
As we mentioned long before
Moammar Gadhafi was ousted in Libya, jihadists
and other militants thrive in power vacuums. This assertion has proved true
in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, and more recently in Libya, northern Mali and
now Syria. Weapons
flooding into such regions only compound the problem.
Militant Islamists have seized
the opportunity to grow in influence in such places, as have the subset of
militant Islamists we call jihadists. So in this context, while the al Qaeda
core has been crippled, other portions of the jihadist movement are thriving.
This is especially so among those that aspire to mount local insurgencies
rather than those more concerned with planning transnational attacks. The
nuances are important because as
the composition and objectives of jihadist groups change, so do their methods
of attack.
Scott Stewart, Stratfor
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