The Growing Irrelevance of NATO

The most interesting thing about the NATO summit, apart from the demonstrations in Chicago, was the clear tension between NATO and Russia and its allies. For example, no Central Asian leaders attended the summit, and the leaders of Armenia and Belarus were notably absent. Although not part of NATO, these country's leaders were invited and chose not to come. Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev had been in the United States the day before the summit started, but instead of attending the meeting he returned to Russia.

On the other side, it was announced that NATO air patrols in Baltic airspace would be made permanent. Lithuania followed this announcement by calling for increased NATO military presence for deterrence in the face of Russian militarization. While Lithuania does not drive NATO, the decision to make air patrols permanent and the unease on the frontier between the Russian sphere of influence and NATO is significant.

The world is not heading toward another Cold War, and those who argue that all this is simply a throwback to a Cold War mentality are missing the point. The Cold War was a struggle between two global powers, and the battle was fought from Latin America to Asia. Russia is no longer capable of global influence; it is a regional power. However, within its region it has become powerful. It has tremendous influence over many countries of the former Soviet Union, and its military is growing increasingly capable. Obviously, given the low state of its military 10 years ago, it is not difficult for Russia to increase it military proficiency. But still, the closer you get to the frontier between NATO and Russian influence, the more apparent that growth becomes.

There are clearly disputes between Russia and NATO. One dispute is over ballistic missile defense, but another, deeper one is the expansion of NATO into the Baltics, so that St. Petersburg is less than 160 kilometers (100 miles) away from NATO. The Russians had expected, or at least hoped for, limited expansion after the Cold War, a buffer zone rather than the movement of the line east into the former Soviet Union. When that didn't happen, and the colored revolutions broke out -- sponsored, from the Russian point of view, by the West -- Russian fears were ignited.

NATO did not believe it was being aggressive in moving eastward. It saw itself as a stabilizing and democratizing force. Its move to incorporate Eastern Europe and the Baltics was not intended to alarm Russia but in fact to reassure Russia that NATO was making certain that the region remained stable and unthreatening. What NATO intended to project, though, was not what the Russians saw. At the same time, NATO perceives Russian moves in the area of the former Soviet Union as being problematic, even though they were not intended to be hostile.

Thus, Russian allied leaders boycotted the summit and NATO announced permanent air patrols in Baltic airspace. This is tension; it is not the Cold War. The tension is limited by the fact that Russia is not strong enough to pose a real threat beyond the current line, and Europe is far too preoccupied with its internal economic and political crisis to divert attention to the Russian threat. Indeed, whatever NATO does in the Baltic skies, many European nations, particularly Germany, do not perceive Russia as a significant issue.

This is what is strange about the meeting and the times. Russia is growing stronger and that alarms some. But most of Europe sees the Russian-Baltic relationship as being completely irrelevant to the real issues, even as the officials dealing with NATO are approving measures that the Russians will perceive as hostile. The Russians will continue to make gestures, even though they are far more concerned with internal economic matters and economic relations with Europe.

And that is why NATO is simply not that interesting any longer. It is not only an alliance whose mission -- at least in Europe -- is unclear, it is also an alliance perched on top of profound economic, political and social processes that render its concerns irrelevant for the moment.

Stratfor