I am writing this from Greece,
having spent the past week in Europe and having moved among various capitals.
Most discussions I've had in my travels concern U.S. President Barack Obama's
failure to move decisively against Syria and how Russian President Vladimir
Putin outmatched him. Of course, the Syrian intervention had many aspects, and
one of the most important ones, which was not fully examined, was what it told
us about the state of U.S.-European relations and of relations among European
countries. This is perhaps the most important question on the table.
We have spoken of the
Russians, but for all the flash in their Syria performance, they are
economically and militarily weak -- something they would change if they had the
means to do so. It is Europe, taken as a whole, that is the competitor for the
United States. Its economy is still slightly larger than the United States',
and its military is weak, though unlike Russia this is partly by design.
The U.S.-European relationship
helped shape the 20th century. American intervention helped win World War I,
and American involvement in Europe during World War II helped ensure an allied
victory. The Cold War was a transatlantic enterprise, resulting in the
withdrawal of Soviet forces from the European Peninsula. The question now is:
What will the relationship be between these two great economic entities, which
together account for roughly 50 percent of the world's gross domestic product,
in the 21st century? That question towers over all others globally.
A Fluid Concept
The events surrounding the
Syria intervention, which never materialized, hint at the answer to this
question. The Syrian crisis began not with the United States claiming that
action must be taken against al Assad's use of chemical weapons but with calls
to arms from the United Kingdom, France and Turkey. The United States was
rather reluctant, but ultimately it joined these and several other European
countries. Only then did the Europeans' opinions diverge. In the United
Kingdom, the parliament voted against intervention. In Turkey, the government
favored intervention on a much larger scale than the United States wanted. And
in France, which actually had the ability to lend a hand, the president favored
intervention but faced a less enthusiastic parliament.
Most important to note was the
division of Europe. Each country crafted its own response -- or lack of
response -- to the Syrian crisis. The most interesting position was taken by
Germany, which was unwilling to participate and until quite late unwilling to
endorse participation. I've talked about the fragmentation of Europe. Nothing
is more striking than the foreign policy split between France and Germany not
only on Syria but on Mali and Libya as well. One of the central drivers behind
the creation of the European Union and its post-war precursors was the need
bind France and Germany economically. French and German divergence was the root
of European wars. It had to be avoided at all costs.
Yet that divergence has
returned. Their differences have not manifested as virulently as they did
before 1945, but still, it can no longer be said that their foreign policies
are synchronized. In fact, the three major powers on the European Peninsula
currently are pursuing very different foreign policies. The United Kingdom is
moving in its own direction, limiting its involvement in Europe and trying to
find its own course between Europe and the United States. France is focused to
the south, on the Mediterranean and Africa. Germany is trying to preserve the
trade zone and is looking east at Russia.
Nothing has ruptured in
Europe, but then Europe as a concept has always been fluid. The European Union
is a free trade zone that excludes some European countries. It is a monetary
union that excludes some members of the free trade zone. It has a parliament
but leaves defense and foreign policy prerogatives to sovereign nation-states.
It has not become more organized since 1945; in some fundamental ways, it has
become less organized. Where previously there were only geographical divisions,
now there are also conceptual divisions.
Differences between the United
States and Europe were made clear in the Syrian crisis. Had President Obama
chosen to intervene, he could have acted in Syria as he saw fit -- he didn't necessarily
need congressional approval but sought it anyway. Europe could not act because
there really isn't a singular European foreign or defense policy. But more
important, no individual European nation has the ability by itself to conduct
an air attack on Syria. As Libya showed, France and Italy could not execute a
sustained air campaign. They needed the United States.
Cowboys and Naifs
Here in Europe, Obama is
criticized for his handling of the Syria intervention. There is also a general
belief that Putin's foreign policy is a failure. But I am old enough to
remember that Europeans have always thought of U.S. presidents as either naive,
as they did with Jimmy Carter, or as cowboys, as they did with Lyndon Johnson,
and held them in contempt in either case. (Richard Nixon's being honored by the
French is an interesting exception.) After some irrational exuberance from the
European left, Obama has now been deemed naive, just as George W. Bush was
deemed a cowboy.
Europeans obsess much more
over U.S. presidents than Americans obsess over European leaders. They have
strong opinions, most of them negative, about whomever is in office. My
response to such criticism has always been a tricky one. Imagine the fine
sophisticates of 1914 and 1939 with nuclear weapons. Do you think the ones
responsible for entering two horrible wars could have resisted using nuclear
weapons? It is the good fortune of Europe that when leaders were wont to use
nuclear weapons, the Europeans didn't have their fingers on the launch buttons.
These weapons were controlled
by American cowboys and fools and by Russian "conspirators" -- the
European vision of all Russian leaders. Amid profound differences and distrust,
U.S. and Soviet leaders managed to avoid the worst. Given their track record,
Europe's leaders might have plunged the world further into disaster. The
Europeans think well of the sophistication of their diplomacy. I have never
understood why they feel that way.
We saw this in Syria. First,
Europe was all over the place. Then the coalition that coaxed the Americans in
fell apart, leaving the United States virtually alone. When Obama went back to
his original position, they decided that he had been outfoxed by the Russians.
Had he attacked, he would have been dismissed as another cowboy. Whichever way
it had gone, and whatever role Europe played in it, it would have been the
Americans that simply didn't understand one thing or another.
The sentiment differs
throughout Europe. The British were indifferent to the entire matter; they were
far more interested in what the Federal Reserve would say. The Eastern
Europeans, feeling the pressure of the Russians -- both in reality and in their
nightmares -- can't imagine why the Americans would let this happen to them. A
friendly diplomat from the Caucasus told me that he wondered if the Americans
weren't aware they were in a showdown with the Russians.
The American view of Europe is
a combination of indifference and bafflement. Europe has not mattered all that
much to the United States since the end of the Cold War. Since the first Gulf
War, what has mattered is the Muslim world, with various levels of intensity.
Europe was seen as a prosperous backwater, or as I once put it in 1991, all of
Europe became Scandinavia. It was quite prosperous, a pleasure to visit, but
not the place in which history was being made.
When Americans can be bothered
to think of Europe, they think of it as a continent with strong opinions of
what others should do but with little inclination to do something itself. As an
American diplomat told me, "I always go to Paris if I want to be told what
America should do." The American perception of Europe is that it is
unhelpful and irritating but ultimately weak and therefore harmless. The
Europeans are obsessed with the U.S. president because, fool or cowboy or both,
he is extraordinarily powerful. The Americans are indifferent to the Europeans
not because they don't have sophisticated leaders but because ultimately their
policies matter more to each other than they do to the United States. Americans
think little of Europe and then really don't understand what happens there.
It's not clear to me that Europeans get it either.
But the most profound rift
between the Americans and Europeans, however, is not perception or attitude. It
is the notion of singularity, and many of the strange impressions or profound
indifferences between the two stem from this notion. For example, a friend
pointed out that he spoke four languages but Americans seem unable to learn
one. I pointed out that if he took a weekend trip he would need to speak four
languages. Citizens of the United States don't need to learn four languages to
drive 3,000 miles. The dialogue between Europe and the United States is a
dialogue between a single entity and the tower of Babel.
The United States is a unified
country with unified economic, foreign and defense policies. Europe never fully
came together; in fact, for the past five years it has been disintegrating.
Division, as well as a fascinating pride in that division, is one of Europe's
defining characteristics. Unity, as well as fascinating convictions that
everything is coming apart, is one of the United States' defining
characteristics.
Obsession and Fear
Europe's past is magnificent,
and its magnificence can be seen on the streets of any European capital. Its
past haunts and frightens it. Its future is not defined, but its present is
characterized by a denial and a distance from its past. U.S. history is much
shallower. Americans build shopping malls on top of hallowed battlefields and
tear down buildings after 20 years. The United States is a country of amnesia.
It is obsessed with its future, and Europe is paralyzed by its past.
Whenever I visit Europe -- and
I was born in Europe -- I am struck by how profoundly different the two places
are. I am also struck at how the United States is disliked and held in contempt
by Europeans. I am also struck at how little Americans notice or care.
There is talk of the
transatlantic relationship. It is not gone, nor even frayed. Europeans come to
the United States and Americans go to Europe and both take pleasure in the
other. But the connection is thin. Where once we made wars together, we now
take vacations. It is hard to build a Syria policy on that framework, let alone
a North Atlantic strategy.
George Friedman, Stratfor, September 24, 2013
"Geopolitical Journey: The U.S.-European Relationship, Then and Now is republished with permission of Stratfor."
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