Andrew Korybko
Russia is worried that the influence of
hawkish forces inside the US’ “deep state” might be growing and could
ultimately lead to a large-scale conventional strike against it, including by
proxy through Ukraine, which Russia hopes to deter by reminding them that this
would result in World War III.
The hullabaloo over
Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine is misplaced since all that Putin did was
explicitly confirm what was already self-evident to all serious observers.
Nobody should have ever thought that Russia wouldn’t consider a nuclear
response to any overwhelming non-nuclear strike against it or its mutual
defense ally Belarus, nor that it would overlook those who partook in such a
provocation by proxy. Here’s exactly what Putin told the Security Council during their latest meeting on
Wednesday:
“I would like to draw your
attention specifically to the following. The updated version of the document is
supposed to regard an aggression against Russia from any non-nuclear state but
involving or supported by any nuclear state as their joint attack against the
Russian Federation. It also states clearly the conditions for Russia’s
transition to the use of nuclear weapons.
We will consider such a
possibility once we receive reliable information about a massive launch of air
and space attack weapons and their crossing our state border. I mean strategic
and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, UAVs, hypersonic and other aircraft.
We reserve the right to use
nuclear weapons in the event of aggression against Russia and Belarus as a
member of the Union State. All these issues have been agreed upon with the
Belarusian side and the President of Belarus. Including the case when the enemy,
using conventional weapons, creates a critical threat to our sovereignty.”
And here are some background briefings to review before analyzing what this all means:
* 19 August: “Why Might Ukraine Want Russia To Use Nuclear Weapons?”
* 21 August: “Don’t Expect A Radical Response From Russia To The US’ Involvement In Ukraine’s Invasion Of Kursk”
* 12 September: “Korybko To Karaganov: Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine Shouldn’t Apply To Any Territorial Encroachment”
* 15 September: “Russia
& The West Are Engaged In Political Choreography Over Ukraine’s Use Of
Long-Range Weapons”
* 15 September: “What Would Really Be Achieved By Russia Using Nuclear Weapons In Ukraine At This Point?”
* 18 September: “The
‘War Of Attrition’ Was Improvised & Not Russia’s Plan All Along”
* 21 September: “Lavrov Explained What Russia Hopes To Achieve By Talking About Its Red Lines”
* 24 September: “Russia Rebuked The Hawks By Confirming That It Won’t Test Nukes Unless The US Does So First”
The above will now be
summarized for the reader’s convenience.
Russia has no reason to use
nuclear weapons first in Ukraine since it can accomplish all its goals in this
improvised “war of attrition” through conventional means. Crossing that threshold risks
losing the support of its close Chinese and Indian trade partners, which is
what Ukraine wants. Russia also won’t launch a nuclear first strike against
NATO unlike what some have speculated. Putin has remained calm through every one of the West’s
escalations and continues doing his utmost to avoid World War III.
No matter how negatively some
in the West might view his restraint, such as misperceiving it as weakness,
their main decisionmakers still know better than to cross Russia’s ultimate red
lines of launching a direct attack against it and/or Belarus or a large-scale
one against them via their Ukrainian proxy. The first scenario is totally out
of the question, while the second one has been openly discussed among some
Westerners amidst the debate over letting Ukraine use their long-range weapons.
A few NATO-backed but
Ukrainian-fronted long-range attacks would certainly be an escalation, but they
wouldn’t cross Russia’s abovementioned ultimate red lines. The problem though
is that some Westerners have convinced themselves that Russia is indeed so weak
that it wouldn’t consider a nuclear response in the scenario of large-scale
strikes against it. It’s this hawkish faction of the Western elite that his
message is directed towards since he fears that they might be rising in
influence.
Their comparatively more
pragmatic rivals who still call the shots always signal their escalatory
intentions far in advance so that Russia could prepare itself and thus be less
likely to “overreact” in some way that risks World War III. Likewise, Russia
continues restraining itself from replicating the US’ “shock-and-awe” campaign
in order to reduce the likelihood of the West “overreacting” by directly
intervening in the conflict to salvage their geopolitical project and thus
risking World War III.
It can only be speculated
whether this interplay is due to each’s permanent military, intelligence, and
diplomatic bureaucracies (“deep state”) behaving responsibly on their own
considering the enormity of what’s at stake or if it’s the result of a “gentlemen’s
agreement”. Whatever the truth may be, the aforesaid model accounts for the
unexpected moves or lack thereof from each, which are the US correspondingly
telegraphing its escalatory intentions and Russia never seriously escalating in
kind.
Russia senses that the balance
of influence between these factions within the US’ “deep state” might be
shifting from the comparatively pragmatic one to their more hawkish rivals,
however, which explains why Putin felt the need to explicitly confirm what was
already self-evident about his country’s nuclear doctrine. One explanation is
that the US’ ruling liberal-globalists want
to provoke a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis ahead of Trump’s potential second
inauguration in order to sabotage his promise to broker a peace deal.
Another, which isn’t mutually
exclusive, is that even the comparatively pragmatic faction is beginning to
think that Russia is weak and therefore unlikely to escalate if the US launches
a large-scale strike against it and/or Belarus by proxy through Ukraine. In their mind, this might coerce
Russia into making unilateral concessions in exchange for peace, which could
take the form of it withdrawing from some of the Ukrainian-claimed territory
that it fought so hard to obtain control over since February 2022.
Putin really doesn’t want to
risk doing anything that could inadvertently lead to World War III, hence why
he’s thus far refused to reciprocally escalate every time that the West does,
not to mention whenever they and their Ukrainian proxy crossed Russia’s earlier
red lines. Nevertheless, he also doesn’t want Russia to lose its
sovereignty if the West blackmails to that end it by exploiting these concerns to
coerce it into a never-ending series of unilateral concessions, ergo why he authorized the special operation.
He therefore realized that
it’s time to explicitly confirm what was already self-evident about Russia’s
nuclear doctrine in order to dissuade the American “deep state’s” hawks from
launching a large-scale strike against his country and/or Belarus by proxy
through Ukraine. Depending on how serious it could be, Russia might consider
responding with nukes against Ukraine and/or even some NATO countries,
including before the damage is known upon “receiving reliable information about
a massive launch”.
Once again, nobody should have ever thought that Russia wouldn’t consider a nuclear response to such a scenario, nor that it would overlook those who partook in it. Just because this wasn’t earlier explicitly articulated in its doctrine doesn’t mean that Putin would be forced to rule it out. No leader would ever let their hands be tied like that. Everyone knows this, but US hawks still had to be reminded of it just in case they’ve become so delusional as to think they could do pull off such an attack with impunity.
Andrew Korybko, Substack, September 26, 2024
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Russia Rebuked The Hawks By Confirming That It Won’t Test Nukes Unless The US Does So First
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