Andrew Korybko
Japan was passing everything along to its Western partners in the implied hopes of them then supporting it more in its own part of the world
Belarusian media reported
earlier this month that their security services busted a Japanese spy. He
allegedly entered into a fictitious marriage that helped him legalize his stay
in the country, after which he set up a business in Gomel to explain his travels, including to the border. He also taught
Japanese. The spy allegedly had over 9,000 photos of roads, bridges, and military facilities and was actively in contact with his embassy. These reports raised a lot of eyebrows
since few expected Japan to spy on Belarus.
As it turns out, his home base
of Gomel is in Ukraine’s crosshairs as explained last month here,
and it’s possible that the security services’ additional scrutiny on all
activities there as part of their precautionary measures resulted in them
finally catching him. His interrogation also revealed that he was involved in the failed summer 2020 Color
Revolution and had been monitoring the socio-economic situation as well,
including the availability and prices of goods as well as locals’ reaction to
this.
Considering the importance of his activities, especially in the context of the special operation, there’s no way that he’d be allowed to continue operating if anyone had picked up on what he was doing earlier. It’s therefore almost certainly the case that he only came on their radar recently as was speculated above. This means that he was transmitting highly sensitive information during the past two years of the New Cold War’s top proxy war, thus raising the question of why Japan would want to do this in the first place.
What might have been going on
is that Japan was passing everything along to its Western partners in the
implied hopes of them then supporting it more in its own part of the world. His
most recent activities might also have played a role in Ukraine’s recent drone
provocations in Belarus. In fact, he might have been pressured by his handlers
into taking more risks than usual because the West demanded more information
for Ukraine, which could have contributed to him finally getting caught.
This explanation is the most
logical since Japan couldn’t act on its own with what that spy hadn’t uncovered
this entire time. It was also reported that
he was spying on China’s Belt & Road Initiative investments too, of which
its primary one in Belarus is the “Great Stone” industrial park, which could have disguised his more nefarious
activities had he been caught earlier under different circumstances. It’s much
better, after all, to be busted for conducting “business intelligence” than
military intelligence.
In retrospect, there’s not
much that the security services could have done better to have stopped him
ahead of time. He was legally in Belarus, had his own business, and was also
teaching Japanese at a local university, thus making him a model immigrant.
Nobody could have plausibly suspected that he was up to no good. If there’s any
silver lining to this case, it’s that the spy was finally caught and will no
longer be sharing information with his handlers to pass along to the West and
their Ukrainian proxies.
Andrew Korybko, Substack,
September 24, 2024
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