In September, the U.N. General
Assembly will vote on whether to recognize Palestine as an independent and
sovereign state with full rights in the United Nations. In many ways, this
would appear to be a reasonable and logical step. Whatever the Palestinians
once were, they are clearly a nation in the simplest and most important sense —
namely, they think of themselves as a nation. Nations are created by historical
circumstances, and those circumstances have given rise to a Palestinian
nation. Under the principle of the United Nations and the theory of the
right to national self-determination, which is the moral foundation of the
modern theory of nationalism, a nation has a right to a state, and that state
has a place in the family of nations. In this sense, the U.N. vote will be
unexceptional.
However, when the United
Nations votes on Palestinian statehood, it will intersect with other realities
and other historical processes. First, it is one thing to declare a Palestinian
state; it is quite another thing to create one. The Palestinians are deeply
divided between two views of what the Palestinian nation ought to be, a
division not easily overcome. Second, this vote will come at a time when two of
Israel’s neighbors are coping with their own internal issues. Syria
is in chaos, with an extended and significant resistance against the regime
having emerged. Meanwhile, Egypt is struggling with internal tension over the
fall of President Hosni Mubarak and the future of the military junta that
replaced him. Add to this the U.S.
withdrawal from Iraq and the potential rise of Iranian power, and the
potential recognition of a Palestinian state — while perfectly logical in an
abstract sense — becomes an event that can force a regional crisis in the midst
of ongoing regional crises. It thus is a vote that could have significant
consequences.
The Palestinian Divide
Let’s begin with the issue not
of the right of a nation to have a state but of the nature of a Palestinian
state under current circumstances. The
Palestinians are split into two major factions. The first, Fatah, dominates
the West Bank. Fatah derives its ideology from the older, secular Pan-Arab
movement. Historically, Fatah saw the Palestinians as a state within the Arab
nation. The second, Hamas, dominates Gaza. Unlike Fatah, it sees the
Palestinians as forming part of a broader Islamist uprising, one in which Hamas
is the dominant Islamist force of the Palestinian people.
The Pan-Arab rising is
moribund. Where it once threatened the existence of Muslim states, like the
Arab monarchies, it is now itself threatened. Mubarak, Syrian President Bashar
al Assad and Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi all represented the old Pan-Arab
vision. A much better way to understand the “Arab
Spring” is that it represented the decay of such regimes that were
vibrant when they came to power in the late 1960s and early 1970s but have
fallen into ideological meaninglessness. Fatah is part of this grouping, and
while it still speaks for Palestinian nationalism as a secular movement, beyond
that it is isolated from broader trends in the region. It is both at odds with
rising religiosity and simultaneously mistrusted by the monarchies it tried to
overthrow. Yet it controls the Palestinian proto-state, the Palestinian
National Authority, and thus will be claiming a U.N. vote on Palestinian
statehood. Hamas, on the other hand, is very much representative of current
trends in the Islamic world and holds significant popular support, yet it is
not clear that it holds a majority position in the Palestinian nation.
All nations have ideological
divisions, but the Palestinians are divided over the fundamental question of
the Palestinian nation’s identity. Fatah sees itself as part of a secular Arab
world that is on the defensive. Hamas envisions the Palestinian nation as an
Islamic state forming in the context of a region-wide Islamist rising. Neither
is in a position to speak authoritatively for the Palestinian people, and the
things that divide them cut to the heart of the nation. As important, each has
a different view of its future relations with Israel. Fatah has accepted, in
practice, the idea of Israel’s permanence as a state and the need of the
Palestinians to accommodate themselves to the reality. Hamas has rejected it.
The U.N. decision raises the
stakes in this debate within the Palestinian nation that could lead to intense
conflict. As vicious as the battle between
Hamas and Fatah has been, an uneasy truce has existed over recent
years. Now, there could emerge an internationally legitimized state, and
control of that state will matter more than ever before. Whoever controls the
state defines what the Palestinians are, and it becomes increasingly difficult
to suspend the argument for a temporary truce. Rather than settling anything,
or putting Israel on the defensive, the vote will compel a Palestinian crisis.
Fatah has an advantage in any
vote on Palestinian statehood: It enjoys far more international support than
Hamas does. Europeans and Americans see it as friendly to their interests and
less hostile to Israel. The Saudis and others may distrust Fatah from past
conflicts, but in the end they fear radical Islamists and Iran and so require
American support at a time when the Americans have tired of playing in what
some Americans call the “sandbox.” However reluctantly, while aiding Hamas, the
Saudis are more comfortable with Fatah. And of course, the embattled Arabist
regimes, whatever tactical shifts there may have been, spring from the same
soil as Fatah. While Fatah is the preferred Palestinian partner for many, Hamas
can also use that reality to portray Fatah as colluding with Israel against the
Palestinian people during a confrontation.
For its part, Hamas has the
support of Islamists in the region, including Shiite Iranians, but that is an
explosive mix to base a strategy on. Hamas must break its isolation if it is to
counter the tired but real power of Fatah. Symbolic flotillas from Turkey are
comforting, but Hamas needs an end to Egyptian
hostility to Hamas more than anything.
Egypt’s Role and Fatah on
the Defensive
Egypt is the power that
geographically isolates Hamas through its treaty with Israel and with its
still-functional blockade on Gaza. More than anyone, Hamas needs genuine regime
change in Egypt. The new regime it needs is not a liberal democracy but one in
which Islamist forces supportive of Hamas, namely the Muslim
Brotherhood, come to power.
At the moment, that is not
likely. Egypt’s
military has retained a remarkable degree of control, its opposition groups
are divided between secular and religious elements, and the religious elements
are further divided among themselves — as well as penetrated by an Egyptian
security apparatus that has made war on them for years. As it stands, Egypt is
not likely to evolve in a direction favorable to Hamas. Therefore, Hamas needs
to redefine the political situation in Egypt to convert a powerful enemy into a
powerful friend.
Though it is not easy for a
small movement to redefine a large nation, in this case, it could perhaps
happen. There is a broad sense of unhappiness in Egypt over Egypt’s treaty with
Israel, an issue that comes to the fore when Israel and the Palestinians are
fighting. As in other Arab countries, passions surge in Egypt when the
Palestinians are fighting the Israelis.
Under Mubarak, these passions
were readily contained in Egypt. Now the Egyptian regime unquestionably is
vulnerable, and pro-Palestinian feelings cut across most, if not all,
opposition groups. It is a singular, unifying force that might suffice to break
the military’s power, or at least to force the military to shift its Israeli
policy.
Hamas in conflict with Israel
as the United Nations votes for a Palestinian state also places Fatah on the
political defensive among the Palestinians. Fatah cooperation with Israel while
Gaza is at war would undermine Fatah, possibly pushing Fatah to align with
Hamas. Having the U.N. vote take place while Gaza is at war, a vote possibly
accompanied by General Assembly condemnation of Israel, could redefine the
region.
Last week’s attack
on the Eilat road should be understood in this context. Some are
hypothesizing that new Islamist groups forming in the Sinai or Palestinian
groups in Gaza operating outside Hamas’ control carried out the attack. But
while such organizations might formally be separate from Hamas, I find it
difficult to believe that Hamas, with an excellent intelligence service inside
Gaza and among the Islamist groups in the Sinai, would not at least have known
these groups’ broad intentions and would not have been in a position to stop
them. Just as Fatah created Black September in the 1970s, a group that appeared
separate from Fatah but was in fact covertly part of it, the strategy of
creating new organizations to take the blame for conflicts is an old tactic
both for the Palestinians and throughout the world.
Hamas’ ideal attack would
offer it plausible deniability — allowing it to argue it did not even know an
attack was imminent, much less carry it out — and trigger an Israeli attack on
Gaza. Such a scenario casts Israel as the aggressor and Hamas as the victim,
permitting Hamas to frame the war to maximum effect in Egypt and among the
Palestinians, as well as in the wider Islamic world and in Europe.
Regional Implications and
Israel’s Dilemma
The matter goes beyond Hamas.
The Syrian
regime is currently fighting for its life against its majority Sunni
population. It has survived thus far, but it needs to redefine the conflict.
The Iranians and Hezbollah are among those most concerned with the fall of the
Syrian regime. Syria
has been Iran’s one significant ally, one strategically positioned to
enhance Iranian influence in the Levant. Its fall would be a strategic setback
for Iran at a time when Tehran is looking to enhance its position with the U.S.
withdrawal from Iraq. Iran, which sees the uprising as engineered by its
enemies — the United States, Saudi Arabia and Turkey — understandably wants al
Assad to survive.
Meanwhile, the fall of Syria
would leave Hezbollah — which is highly dependent on the current Syrian regime
and is in large part an extension of Syrian policy in Lebanon — wholly
dependent on Iran. And Iran without its Syrian ally is very far away from
Hezbollah. Like Tehran, Hezbollah thus also wants al Assad to survive.
Hezbollah joining Hamas in a confrontation with Israel would take the focus off
the al Assad regime and portray his opponents as undermining resistance to
Israel. Joining a war with Israel also would make it easier for Hezbollah to
weather the fall of al Assad should his opponents prevail. It would help
Hezbollah create a moral foundation for itself independent of Syria. Hezbollah’s
ability to force a draw with Israel in 2006 constituted a victory for
the radical Islamist group that increased its credibility dramatically.
The 2006 military
confrontation was also a victory for Damascus, as it showed the Islamic world
that Syria was the only nation-state supporting effective resistance to Israel.
It also showed Israel and the United States that Syria alone could control
Hezbollah and that forcing Syria out of Lebanon was a strategic error on the
part of Israel and the United States.
Faced with this dynamic, it
will be difficult for Fatah to maintain its relationship with Israel. Indeed,
Fatah could be forced to initiate an intifada, something it would greatly
prefer to avoid, as this would undermine what economic development the West
Bank has experienced.
Israel therefore conceivably
could face conflict in Gaza, a conflict along the Lebanese border and a rising
in the West Bank, something it clearly knows. In a rare move, Israel announced
plans to call up reserves in September. Though preannouncements of such things
are not common, Israel wants to signal resolution.
Israel has two strategies in
the face of the potential storm. One is a devastating attack on Gaza followed
by rotating forces to the north to deal with Hezbollah and intense suppression
of an intifada. Dealing with Gaza fast and hard is the key if the intention is
to abort the evolution I laid out. But the problem here is that the three-front
scenario I laid out is simply a possibility; there is no certainty here. If
Israel initiates conflict in Gaza and fails, it risks making a possibility into
a certainty — and Israel has not had many stunning victories for several
decades. It could also create a crisis for Egypt’s military rulers, not
something the Israelis want.
Israel also simply could
absorb the attacks from Hamas to make Israel appear the victim. But seeking
sympathy is not likely to work given how Palestinians have managed to shape
global opinion. Moreover, we would expect Hamas to repeat its attacks to the
point that Israel no longer could decline combat.
War thus benefits Hamas (even
if Hamas maintains plausible deniability by having others commit the attacks),
a war Hezbollah has good reason to enter at such a stage and that Fatah does
not want but could be forced into. Such a war could shift the Egyptian dynamic
significantly to Hamas’ advantage, while Iran would certainly want al-Assad to
be able to say to Syrians that a war with Israel is no time for a civil war in
Syria. Israel would thus find itself fighting three battles simultaneously. The
only way to do that is to be intensely aggressive, making moderation
strategically difficult.
Israel responded modestly
compared to the past after the Eilat incident, mounting only limited attacks on
Gaza against mostly members of the Palestinian Resistance Committees, an
umbrella group known to have links with Hamas. Nevertheless, Hamas has made
clear that its de facto truce with Israel was no longer assured. The issue now
is what Hamas is prepared to do and whether Hamas supporters, Saudi Arabia in
particular, can force them to control anti-Israeli activities in the region.
The Saudis want al Assad to fall, and they do not want a radical regime in
Egypt. Above all, they do not want Iran’s hand strengthened. But it is never
clear how much influence the Saudis or Egyptians have over Hamas. For Hamas,
this is emerging as the perfect moment, and it is hard to believe that even the
Saudis can restrain them. As for the Israelis, what will happen depends on what
others decide — which is the fundamental strategic problem that Israel has.
George Friedman, Stratfor,
Aug. 22, 2011
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