George Friedman
This week, Vladimir Putin was
sworn in for a third term as Russian president, and France's presidential
election continued the trend of losses for incumbent European governments when
French President Nicolas Sarkozy lost to socialist challenger Francois Hollande. Putin's
return to the presidency was not unexpected; he was never really unseated as
Russia's leader even during Dmitri Medvedev's presidency. Nevertheless, the
changes in Europe exemplified by the French presidential election will require
Russia to change its tactics in Europe.
Putin's Plans for Russia
and Beyond
Russia has been on the path to
resurgence since Putin won the presidency in 1999. He inherited a broken, weak
and chaotic Russia. As Stratfor
has noted over the years, Putin did
not seek to re-create the Soviet Union. He is a student of geopolitics, and
he understands Russia's constraints and the overreaching that led to the fall
of the Soviet Union. Putin's mission was to return Russia to stability and
security -- a
massive undertaking for the leader of a country that not only is the
world's largest but also is internally diverse and surrounded by potentially
hostile powers.
During his first presidential
term, Putin launched a comprehensive series of reforms that recentralized power
over the Russian regions, cracked down on militancy in the Russian Caucasus,
purged the oligarch class and centralized the economy and political system. Putin
implemented an autocratic regime and used the military and Russia's security
apparatus (including the Federal Security Service), following the example of
previous leaders, from the czars to the Soviet rulers. Putin's maneuvers
were the natural evolution of how a successful leader rules Russia.
With Russia strong and steady,
Putin was able to focus on his
country's near abroad. However, the countries surrounding Russia were
hostile to the Kremlin's view, with NATO and the European Union pushing ever
closer to Russia's borders and forming partnerships with numerous former Soviet
states. The czars and Soviet rulers used two primary tactics to counter such a
situation.
The first tactic was to
mobilize Russia's military to push out foreign influence, whether directly (as
Moscow has done with Georgia) or indirectly (by forging military alliances with
former Soviet states such as Belarus and Kazakhstan). Although Putin's Russia
could do this for one or two countries, it could not use this tactic everywhere
in its periphery.
The second tactic was to
create alliances of convenience in Europe to help Moscow divide pan-European
and NATO expansion and sentiment against Russia while bolstering Russia
economically, financially and technologically. Czarist Russia made such
arrangements with the United Kingdom during the Napoleonic Wars and with France
ahead of World War I, and Soviet leaders formed an alliance of convenience with
Germany ahead of World War II. It is not that Russia ever trusted any of these
countries (or vice versa), but the Russian and European leaderships shared an
inherent understanding that certain alliances are necessary to shape the
dynamics on the Continent.
During Putin's era, Russia set
its sights on what it considered three of the four premier European powers:
Germany, France and Italy. The Kremlin considers the United Kingdom the fourth
main power, but London's
firm and traditional alliance with the United States has made it
resistant to Russia's overtures. The Kremlin saw Germany, France and Italy as
the countries holding the economic, political and military heft that, if
unified within Western alliance structures, could oppose Russia in Europe. In
order to forge partnerships with these countries, Putin built relationships
with their rulers.
Putin's Personal Approach
Germany was Russia's natural
first choice for a partnership; not only is
it the core of Europe, but it is also the European state that the Kremlin
fears most. Moreover, Putin has an affinity for Germany that dates back to his
days with the KGB, when he was stationed in Dresden, Germany. In the early
2000s, Putin was able to use his fluency in German to develop a strong
friendship with then-German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. Schroeder saw the
relationship first as an economic opportunity, since Russia is the world's
largest energy producer and exporter and also a place for potential heavy
investment.
During Schroeder's
chancellorship, trade between Germany and Russia boomed, and Russia gave
Germany special benefits as an energy partner. Germany -- in accordance with
Putin's plan -- began supporting Russia's position in Europe on specific
strategic issues. Schroeder's Germany was alone among Western governments in
not vociferously supporting Ukraine's Orange Revolution in 2004-2005. Schroeder
also led European opposition to U.S. efforts to begin the NATO accession
process for Ukraine and Georgia.
As his friendship with Putin
grew, Schroeder purchased an estate outside Moscow near Putin's home and even
sought Putin's assistance in adopting two Russian children. Schroeder's
ejection from office in 2005 did not end their friendship -- or Schroeder's
usefulness to Putin. Despite widespread German criticism, even from Schroeder's
own party, the former chancellor accepted a position with Russian state natural
gas firm Gazprom to lead the
Nord Stream project, a pipeline designed specifically to maximize Russia's
energy leverage over Belarus, Ukraine and Poland.
Having created a strong
relationship with Berlin, Putin established a similar relationship with
France's then-President Jacques Chirac. France's
position is different from Germany's in that France is not
connected economically or politically with Russia. However, Paris
understands the history of strong Berlin-Moscow ties and what those mean for
all of Europe. France thus has an interest in making sure it is not left out
when Russia and Germany meet. The relationship between Chirac and Putin took
this a step further.
At the beginning of their
relationship, Putin and Chirac allied politically against the U.S.-led war in
Iraq. This was important to Moscow because it undermined
NATO's unity on a critical issue. More important for Russia's
interests, Chirac lobbied against NATO's expansion to include the Baltic states
of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Baltics were admitted despite Chirac's
objections, and when the next NATO summit occurred -- in Latvia -- Chirac
invited Putin to the meeting as his guest.
Putin was close friends with
the French and German leaders, but he was like a brother to Italy's then-Prime
Minister Silvio Berlusconi. This relationship was more personal, because Italy
was not as strategic (or threatening) as the other two European powers. Putin
and Berlusconi vacationed together, spent birthdays together and bought each
other expensive gifts. In 2011, when Berlusconi was on trial for sexual
improprieties, Putin publically defended his friend, saying the allegations
were "made out of envy." The Putin-Berlusconi friendship led to relationships
between Russian and Italian energy companies, banks and military industrial
projects. Most notable, Putin was able to use his relationship with Berlusconi
to get Gazprom access to Italian state-linked energy giant ENI's assets
throughout North Africa, particularly in Libya.
Putin's personal connections
with Germany, France and Italy did not change with the leadership shifts in
each country from 2005 to 2007, nor did they change when Putin left the
presidential spotlight to become prime minister in 2008. Putin used the
momentum built under the previous governments to forge relationships -- even if
not as personal -- with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President
Nicolas Sarkozy and (for a time) Italy's then-Prime Minister Romano Prodi.
Putin's circle of friends and associates helped him shape some of Russia's most
important strategies in Europe: complicating NATO expansion, pushing Moscow's
agenda with NATO, expanding military relationships and becoming capable of invading
Georgia without European or NATO intervention. It is not that all of
this was possible because of Putin's personal relationships with the leaders of
Italy, France and Germany, but those connections facilitated many of the deals
that made Russia's progress possible.
Changes Across Europe
As Putin returns to the
presidency, he faces a very different Europe -- one in which nearly all of his
close friends are out of power. As prime minister, Putin focused on Russia's
internal issues while Europe became embroiled in a political and financial
crisis that has affected the Continent as a whole. Europe is not as concerned
as it once was with the wider world (including Russia). Instead, each state is
focused on keeping itself -- and some form of the European alliance -- intact.
Voters have ejected two of the
three Russian-friendly European governments during these crises. Berlusconi
and his political machine were forced from power in favor of
technocrat and now Prime Minister Mario Monti. Monti lacks the political
mandate or the will to become involved in geopolitical alignments like a close
relationship with Russia. France's Chirac has retired from politics, and Sarkozy
was voted out of office the day before Putin was inaugurated. France's
Hollande surrounds himself with politicians who have not been in government at
any point when Putin was in charge in Russia. This leaves Merkel, whose ties
with Putin are the weakest in the Russian leader's European circle.
Furthermore, Merkel is concerned with holding Europe together, leaving little
time or interest for Russia's plans for Europe.
Thus, Putin's tactic of using
personal relationships to help strengthen Russia's position in Europe seems to
be outdated. The French and Italian governments are still young, so Putin could
try to build relationships with Hollande and Monti. But, like Germany, France
and Italy are more interested in what is happening in Europe than in Russia.
This new attitude toward
Russia already has surfaced in Rome. In the first talks between the new
Italian government and the Russian government, Italian President Giorgio
Napolitano made it clear that the Moscow-Rome relationship would undergo a
"depersonalization." The first evidence of this was Italy's embrace
of U.S.
ballistic missile defense plans for Europe. Italy -- like France --
long supported Russia's position on missile defense in Europe. Although this
did not prevent Washington from moving forward with its plans, it did create
disagreements within NATO. Italy's shift toward unity with NATO and the United
States comes just before what was to be a NATO-Russia summit in Chicago, but
Russia has been disinvited.
The changes in Europe's
leadership and focus come amid Russia's adjustments to other new dynamics in
Europe. Before the Continent's financial and political crises, Russia had
forged a new strategy for foreign
policy regarding Europe in which strategic European partners --
especially Germany, France and Italy -- would invest heavily in Russia's
economy and financial sector. With Europe nearly broke, however, this strategy
has been cut back and could be abandoned altogether. Russia is
proceeding with European partners on some projects, but Moscow must financially
step up more than it anticipated for these projects to succeed. It is an
expensive foreign policy choice.
Russia's main goal regarding
Europe is to keep European powers divided while extracting what Moscow wants
financially and technologically. The days have passed when Putin could call
a friend in Europe to help with NATO or with technological
deficiencies. Russia has to design a new strategy to deal with a very different
Europe and adhere to its deeper imperatives rather than rely on personal and
political relationships, which are fleeting compared to the forces of
geopolitics.
George Friedman, Stratfor,
may 8, 2012
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