The U.S. and its allies are putting forth a
half-effort against the terrorist group. That won’t be enough
David
Rothkopf
The Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria
(ISIS) is a pernicious, brutal organization that directly threatens the
stability of the Middle East, and ultimately, nations worldwide. It is also
roughly the size of a small American state university, fielding no more than
30,000. It doesn’t have an air force, a navy, a reliable tax base or any of the
other resources found in even the smallest and most fragile of nations.
The U.S. needed only 31⁄2 years to defeat the
Axis in World War II. During that war Germany alone was able to field more than
20 million soldiers. So why, when U.S. Admiral John Kirby, the spokesperson for
the most powerful military force the world has ever known, was asked how long
it might take to defeat the modest threat posed by ISIS, did he say that it
could take five years, six years or even more?
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Heavy air strikes have helped hold back ISIS in
the Syrian border town of Kobani, but more is needed. Photo: Bulent
Kilic/AFP/Getty Images
|
While it’s well known that fighting
insurgencies is challenging—witness the 13-year war against the Taliban—that’s
not the whole answer. Unlike al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, ISIS
isn’t fighting purely guerrilla-style, fading in and out of the background.
ISIS is seeking to claim and hold territory, build and maintain supply chains,
protect illicit oil shipments—all in the effort to construct a state. ISIS is a
hybrid force—part insurgency and part traditional army—and the U.S. should have
no trouble defeating a traditional army.
But to do that, you need to rely on more than
just air strikes. Ground forces are needed to seize and hold territory where
ISIS has been weakened. While those troops needn’t be entirely or even
primarily American, if Washington is leading a coalition against ISIS, and it
is, then the U.S. must be on the ground as well. There is no other way.
That leadership can’t be left up to the rest of
the U.S. coalition. Most of the participants have really only signed up for
secondary duty, far from the battles on the ground. Virtually none have made
meaningful commitments to field the troops and take the risks needed not only
to degrade ISIS but to defeat it. With some—like Turkey and Qatar—it can be
hard to tell whose side they’re really on.
The coalition and the U.S. have repeatedly
shown they lack the two things needed to ensure a decisive victory. The first
is will. That means the will to commit the right forces in the right numbers,
with the associated risks—and the will to work allies to ensure they do their
part as well. Turkey, for instance, needs to know that failure to be a
dependable partner against ISIS will call its NATO membership into question.
The second issue is a question of strategy.
When President Obama admitted in August that “we don’t have a strategy yet” on
ISIS, he lived up to the old Washington maxim that a gaffe is just a politician
accidentally telling the truth. But his later assurance that the U.S. did indeed
have a strategy was unconvincing. Absent the will to win, there is no strategy
that will work.
Even if the U.S. manages to defeat ISIS
militarily in Iraq or Syria, there is no clear plan to fill the political,
economic and social void that will be created by its elimination. In Syria
victory over ISIS might end up empowering the brutal regime of President Bashar
Assad, which is already responsible for a war that’s produced 200,000 deaths
and a massive humanitarian catastrophe. In Iraq, if the only result is a
Shi‘ite-led regime in Baghdad that acts much like the last one, it won’t be
long before Sunni unrest invites the rise of a new insurgency. We’ve seen that
movie once before.
We need a broader strategy to curb the alarming
spread of violent extremism, which currently takes the form of dozens of groups
from West Africa to Asia. Insiders call it “squeezing the balloon”—getting rid
of the problem in one place only to see it burst forth in another. It’s not
enough, as the President recently suggested, to simply see this as a
“generational problem.”
And that’s the rub. One can’t help but look at
the current ad hoc, halfhearted effort against ISIS without thinking that the
goal isn’t really beating ISIS, but beating back bad press. It’s a policy built
around keeping a lid on public criticism—at least until the President has
cleaned out his desk in the Oval Office.
David Rothkopf, TIME Magazine, November 10, 2014
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