Summary
Russia is making a concerted effort to increase
its military and security presence throughout Central Asia, just not for the
reasons it would have you think. Though the Kremlin is concerned with the
threat of spillover violence from Islamist militancy in Afghanistan — its
purported motive for deploying more troops — it is far more alarmed by what it
sees as Chinese and Western encroachment into lands over which it has long held
sway. It is this concern that will shape Moscow's behavior in Central Asia in
the years to come.
Analysis
Central Asia has played an important role in
the projection of Russian military power since the Russian Empire's expansion
in the 18th and 19th centuries. During this period, Russia established military
outposts as it competed with the British Empire for influence in the region. By
the mid-19th century, Russia had brought modern-day Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan into its empire. In the early 20th
century, the countries were incorporated into the Soviet Union.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia
retained a military presence in Central Asia and played a major role in
regional conflicts, such as the 1992-1997 Tajik civil war. Today Russia still
has military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Kazakhstan is a member of
the Collective Security Treaty
Organization, a
military bloc dominated by Moscow. And while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan
are not members of the bloc, they do have important security and military ties
with Russia through arms purchases.
Concerns of Militancy
Russia's long-standing influence in Central
Asian military affairs frames several of the country's recent moves. On April
2, the base commander of Russia's 201st military base in Tajikistan said Russia
would increase the number of troops stationed there from 5,900 to 9,000 over
the next five years and add more military equipment through 2020. Then on April
3 an unnamed source in the General Staff of the Russian armed forces told
Kommersant that Russia was prepared to grant Tajikistan $1.2 billion in
military aid over the next few years. Russian military specialists were
reportedly dispatched to Turkmenistan's border with Afghanistan on March 24 as
well. Turkmen officials have yet to confirm this, but local media report that
Ashgabat requested Russian assistance to protect the Afghan border.
Officially, these developments are tied to
growing concern over violence spilling over from Afghanistan into Central
Asia. It is a legitimate fear for many Central Asian governments as NATO and
the United States draw down their forces in Afghanistan. Regional governments
have voiced discomfort with the increased militant presence in northern
Afghanistan, including the Taliban and theIslamic State.
Russia has echoed this fear. Russian President
Vladimir Putin's special representative for Afghanistan alleged that Islamic
State fighters in the north are training thousands of militants near the
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan borders. Collective Security Treaty Organization
summits have focused on the issue, and Tajikistan urged the bloc to do more to
counter the threat at the April 1-2 Dushanbe summit.
Despite a definite uptick in militant attacks
in northern Afghanistan, no concrete evidence has emerged of attacks over the
border in Central Asian states. Central Asia's last major wave of regionwide
militancy was 1999-2001, when the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan conducted attacks in the
Fergana Valley in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The U.S. intervention
in Afghanistan following 9/11, however, wiped out much of the group. Surviving
elements then dispersed throughout the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area.
Since then, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and
Kazakhstan have seen some attacks by Islamist militants. But many were related
to political dynamics, not the movement in Afghanistan. A spillover of Afghan
militancy is possible, but so far the threat is minimal.
More Pertinent Factors
Because Islamist spillover from northern
Afghanistan is still a relatively minor threat, Russia's push into Central Asia
may have other motivations. Moscow is engaged in a tense standoff with the West
over Ukraine, just one theater in the competition for influence along the former Soviet
periphery. Central
Asia is another key region in this contest. The region
possesses sizable oil and natural gas resources that are attractive to the
European Union as it seeks to diversify energy supplies and end its dependence
on Russia. Europe has already pursued Turkmenistan to join the Trans-Caspian pipeline project.
The United States has also been active in
Central Asia, particularly from a security standpoint. The United States no
longer uses Central Asian military bases that had been logistical centers for
operations in Afghanistan, such as the Kant Air Base in Kyrgyzstan or the
Karshi-Khanabad Air Base in Uzbekistan. These bases, however, have left a
regional legacy. Washington maintains some security operations that include
counternarcotics training with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
The United States has also expressed interest
in increasing its commitment. The commander of U.S. Central Command, Gen. Lloyd
Austin, said the United States was willing to provide military equipment and
technology to support Turkmenistan's efforts to secure its border with
Afghanistan. The United States also announced in January that it would grant
over 200 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles to Uzbekistan previously used
in the U.S. Northern Distribution Network in Afghanistan. Such gestures point
to a U.S. desire to develop more cooperative security relationships with
Central Asian states.
Moscow's military and security expansion
efforts stem partly from its concern about these gestures. But Russia has not
limited itself to deploying military personnel. Moscow has expanded the scope
and membership of its Eurasian Union to include broader cooperation
on issues including border controls. Kazakhstan is already a member, and
Kyrgyzstan will soon join. Russia increased the number of exercises held by
Collective Security Treaty Organization members. It also called on Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan to cooperate more with the security bloc, though both have
been hesitant.
However, Moscow's ability to solidify its
position in Central Asia will be limited. Russia has a weak economy. Already,
many Central Asian migrants who once worked in Russia have left, causing a
decline in Russian remittances to the region. The West, and particularly the
United States, will continue to have influence in the region. China, too, will
continue to make economic and energy inroads.
Meanwhile, instability in the region will
probably increase. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan both have potential succession
crises in the offing. Moreover, demographic growth and competition over water
resources are likely to threaten the region's security. Russia will see its
position in Central Asia tested in the coming years. Islamist militancy is just
one concern among many for Moscow and Central Asian governments.
"Why
Russia Will Send More Troops to Central Asia is republished with
permission of Stratfor."
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