George Friedman
In a week when the European
crisis continued building, the White House chose publicly to focus on
announcements about the end of wars. The death of Moammar Gadhafi was said to
mark the end of the war in Libya, and excitement about a new democratic Libya
abounded. Regarding Iraq, the White House transformed the refusal of the Iraqi
government to permit U.S. troops to remain into a decision by Washington
instead of an Iraqi rebuff.
Though in both cases there was
an identical sense of “mission accomplished,” the matter was not nearly as
clear-cut. The withdrawal from Iraq creates enormous strategic complexities
rather than closure. While the complexities in Libya are real but hardly
strategic, the two events share certain characteristics and are instructive.
Libya After Gadhafi
Let us begin with the lesser
event, Gadhafi’s
death. After seven months of NATO intervention, Gadhafi was killed. That it
took so long for this to happen stands out, given that the intervention involved
far more than airstrikes, including special operations forces on the ground
targeting for airstrikes, training Libyan troops, managing logistics,
overseeing communications and both planning and at times organizing and leading
the Libyan insurgents in battle.
Perhaps this length of time
resulted from a strategy designed to minimize casualties at the cost of
prolonging the war. Alternatively, that it took seven months to achieve this
goal might reflect the extent of the insurgents’ division, poor training and
incompetence. Whatever the reason, the more important question is what NATO
thinks it has accomplished with Gadhafi’s death, as satisfying as that death
might be.
The National
Transitional Council (NTC), the umbrella organization crafted to
contain the insurgents, is in no position to govern Libya by any ideology, let
alone through constitutional democracy. Gadhafi and his supporters ruled Libya
for 42 years; the only people in the NTC with any experience with government
gained that experience as ministers or lesser officials in Gadhafi’s
government. Some may have switched sides out of principle, but I suspect that
most defected to save themselves. While the media has portrayed many of these
ex-ministers as opponents of Gadhafi, anyone who served him was complicit in
his crimes.
These individuals are the
least likely to bring reform to Libya and the most likely to constitute the
core of a new state, as they are the only Libyans who know what it means to
govern. Around them is an array
of tribes living in varying degrees of tension and hostility with each
other and radical Islamists whose number and capabilities are unknown, but
whose access to weapons can be assumed. It also is safe to assume that many
of those weapons, of various types of lethality, will be on the black market in
the region in short order, as they may already be.
Gadhafi did not rule for 42
years without substantial support, as the tenacity of those who fought on his
behalf suggests. (The defense of Sirte could well be described as fanatical.)
Gadhafi is dead, but not all of his supporters are. And there are other
elements within the country who may not be Gadhafi supporters but are no less
interested in resisting those who are now trying to take charge — and resisting
anyone perceived to be backed by Western powers. As with the conquest of
Baghdad in 2003, what was unanticipated — but should not have been — was that a
variety of groups would resist the new leaders and wage guerrilla war.
Baghdad taught that
overwhelming force must be brought to bear in any invasion such that all
opposition is eliminated. Otherwise, opponents of foreign occupation — along
with native elements with a grudge against other natives — are quite capable of
creating chaos. When we look at the list of NTC members and try to imagine them
cooperating with each other and when we consider the number of Gadhafi
supporters who are now desperadoes with little to lose, the path to stable
constitutional democracy runs either through NATO occupation (unofficial, of
course) or through a period of intense chaos. The most likely course ahead is a
NATO presence sufficient to enrage the Libyan people but insufficient to
intimidate them.
And Libya is not a strategic
country. It is neither large in population nor geographically pivotal. It
does have oil, as everyone likes to point out, and that makes it appealing.
But it is not clear that the presence of oil increases the tendency toward
stability. When we look back on Iraq, an oil-rich country, oil simply became
another contentious issue in a galaxy of contentious issues.
The Lesson of Baghdad
Regarding Libya, I have a
sense of Baghdad in April 2003. U.S. President Barack Obama’s announcement of a
complete U.S. withdrawal from Iraq gives us a sense of what lies at the end of
the tunnel of the counterinsurgency. It must be understood that Obama did not
want a total withdrawal. Until just a few weeks before the announcement, he was
looking for ways to keep
some troops in Iraq’s Kurdish region. U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta
went to Iraq wanting an agreement providing for a substantial number of U.S.
troops in Iraq past the Dec. 31 deadline for withdrawal.
While the idea did appeal to
some in Iraq, it ultimately failed. This is because the decision-making
structure of the Iraqi government that emerged from U.S. occupation
and the war is so fragmented it has failed even to craft a law on hydrocarbons,
something critical to the future of Iraq. It was therefore in no position to
reach consensus, or even a simple majority, over the question of a continued
presence of foreign troops. Many Iraqis did want a U.S. presence, particularly
those concerned about their fate once the United States leaves, such as the
Kurds and Sunnis. The most important point is not that the Iraqis decided they
did not want troops; it is that the Iraqi government was in the end too
incoherent to reach any decision.
The strategic dimension to
this is enormous. The Iranians have been developing their influence in Iraq
since before 2003. They have not developed enough power to control Iraq
outright. There are too many in Iraq, even among the Shia, who distrust Iranian
power. Nevertheless, the Iranians have substantial influence — not enough to
impose policies but enough to block any they strongly object to. The Iranians
have a fundamental national security interest in a weak Iraq and in
the withdrawal of American forces, and they had sufficient influence in Baghdad
to ensure American requests to stay were turned down.
Measuring Iranian influence in
Iraq is not easy to do. Much of it consists of influence and relationships that
are not visible or are not used except in urgent matters. The United States,
too, has developed a network of relationships in Iraq, as have the Saudis. But
the United States is not particularly good at developing reliable grassroots
supporters. The Iranians have done better because they are more familiar with
the terrain and because the price for double-crossing the Iranians is much
higher than that imposed by the United States. This gives the Iranians a more
stable platform from which to operate. While the Saudis have tried to have it
both ways by seeking to maintain influence without generating anti-Saudi
feeling, the Iranian position has been more straightforward, albeit in a
complex and devious way.
Let us consider what is at
stake here: Iran has enough influence to shape some Iraqi policies. With the
U.S. withdrawal, U.S. allies will have to accommodate themselves both to Iran
and Iran’s supporters in the government because there is little other choice.
The withdrawal thus does not create a stable balance of power; it creates a
dynamic in which Iranian influence increases if the Iranians want it to — and
they certainly want it to. Over time, the likelihood of Iraq needing to
accommodate Iranian strategic interests is most likely. The possibility of Iraq
becoming a puppet of Iran cannot be ruled out. And this has especially wide
regional consequences given Syria.
The Role of Syria
Consider the Libyan contrast
with Syria. Over the past months, the Syrian opposition has completely failed
in bringing down the regime of Presiden Bashar al Assad. Many of the reports
received about Syria originate from anti-Assad elements outside of Syria who
draw a picture of the impending collapse of the regime. This simply hasn’t
happened, in large part because al
Assad’s military is loyal and well organized and the opposition is
poorly organized and weak. The opposition might have widespread support, but
sentiment does not defeat tanks. Just as Gadhafi was on the verge of victory
when NATO intervened, the Syrian regime does not appear close to collapse. It
is hard to imagine NATO intervening in a country bordering Turkey, Iraq,
Jordan, Israel and Lebanon given the substantial risk of creating regional
chaos. In contrast, Gadhafi was isolated politically and geographically.
Syria
was close to Iran before the uprising. Iran has been the most supportive of
the Syrian regime. If al Assad survives this crisis, his willingness to
collaborate with Iran will only intensify. In Lebanon, Hezbollah — a group the
Iranians have supported for decades — is a major force. Therefore, if the U.S.
withdrawal in Iraq results in substantial Iranian influence in Iraq, and al
Assad doesn’t fall, then the balance of power in the region completely shifts.
This will give rise to a
contiguous arc of Iranian influence stretching from the Persian Gulf to the
Mediterranean Sea running along Saudi Arabia’s northern border and along the
length of Turkey’s southern border. Iranian influence also will impact Israel’s
northern border directly for the first time. What the Saudis, Turks and Israelis
will do about this is unclear. How the Iranians would exploit their position is
equally unclear. Contrary to their reputation, they are very cautious in their
overt operations, even if they take risks in their covert
operations. Full military deployment through this region is unlikely for
logistical reasons if nothing else. Still, the potential for such a deployment,
and the reality of increasingly effective political influence regardless of
military movement, is strategically significant. The fall of al Assad would
create a firebreak for Iranian influence, though it could give rise to a Sunni
Islamist regime.
The point here, of course, is
that the decision to withdraw from Iraq and the inability to persuade the Iraqi
government to let U.S. forces remain has the potential to change the balance of
power in the region. Rather than closing the book on Iraq, it simply opens a
new chapter in what was always the subtext of Iraq, namely Iranian power. The
civil war in Iraq that followed the fall of Saddam Hussein had many dimensions,
but its most strategically important one was the duel between the United States
and Iran. The Obama administration hopes it can maintain U.S. influence in Iraq
without the presence of U.S. troops. Given that U.S. influence with the
presence of troops was always constrained, this is a comforting, though
doubtful, theory for Washington to consume.
The Libyan crisis is not in
such a high-stakes region, but the lesson of Iraq is useful. The NATO
intervention has set the stage for a battle among groups that are not easily
reconciled and who were held together by hostility to Gadhafi and then by NATO
resources. If NATO simply leaves, chaos will ensue. If NATO gives aid, someone
will have to protect the aid workers. If NATO sends troops, someone will attack
them, and when they defend themselves, they will kill innocents. This is the
nature of war. The
idea of an immaculate war is fantasy. It is not that war is not at times
necessary, but a war that is delusional is always harmful. The war in Iraq was
delusional in many ways, and perhaps nowhere more than in the manner in which
the United States left. That is being repeated in Libya, although with smaller
stakes.
In the meantime, the influence
of Iran will grow in Iraq, and now the question is Syria. Another NATO war in
Syria is unlikely and would have unpredictable consequences. The survival of al
Assad would create an unprecedented Iranian sphere of influence, while the fall
of al Assad would open the door to regimes that could trigger an Israeli
intervention.
World War II was nice in that
it offered a clean end — unless, of course, you consider that the Cold War and
the fear of impending nuclear war immediately succeeded it. Wars rarely end
cleanly, but rather fester or set the stage for the next war. We can see that
clearly in Iraq. The universal congratulations on the death of Moammar Gadhafi
are as ominous as all victory celebrations are, because they ignore the
critical question: Now what?
George Friedman, october 25,
2011
Libya and Iraq: The Price of Success is republished with permission of STRATFOR.
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