Andrew Korybko
To paraphrase the famous saying, “Russians saddle slow but ride fast”, so it’s possible that everything might soon accelerate as a result of Russia finally adopting these tactics
An anonymous officer from the
72nd Mechanized Brigade that fought in Ugledar “for about two
years with no relief” told them that “artillery volleys in the area sometimes
reach 10 shells to 1 in favor of Russia and glide bombs launched unopposed from
jets can destroy whole sections of a trench line and anyone manning them.” WaPo
added that Ukraine still struggles to replenish its losses and has been
distracted by its invasion of Russia’s Kursk Region, the latter outcome of which was predictable.
Another interesting tidbit from their report is that “The destruction of railways and bridges (around Pokrovsk) means it is effectively lost”. Readers can learn more about how that city’s capture can be a game-changer for the Donbass front from this analysis here, but it’s also significant that Russia is finally targeting Ukraine’s military logistics. It still won’t touch bridges across the Dnieper nor any of the railways connecting Ukraine to Poland, but at least it’s finally destroying those near the front.
While none of these tactics
are novel, it’s the first time that they’ve been employed by Russia, let alone
altogether. Dropping “meat assaults” in favor of small assault teams was long
overdue, as was bombing Ukrainian trenches and targeting its military logistics
near the front line. Russia has always been far ahead in the “race of logistics”/“war of attrition”, but it’s only just now doing something other than relying on
brute force by finally devising more effective ways to leverage this advantage.
To paraphrase the famous
saying, “Russians saddle slow but ride fast”, so it’s possible that everything
might soon accelerate as a result of Russia finally adopting these tactics. The
question still remains, however, about why it took so long to make these
improvisations. This delay entailed enormous costs. The most likely explanation
is that its armed forces didn’t have viable feedback loops until recently.
Inaccurate portrayals of the front-line situation might also have mudded the
command’s perceptions.
The combination of these two
accounts for why it took so long for Russia to implement what its supporters
have been wanting it to do for a while. These problems aren’t exclusive to its
armed forces though since they plague Russia in general. It’s not uncommon for
someone to tell their superiors what they think they want to hear instead of
sharing brutal truths with them. Likewise, superiors rarely feel comfortable
acknowledging that their plans aren’t working, hence why they don’t often seek
feedback.
Sharing unsolicited advice is
considered deeply offensive because it’s seen as questioning a superior’s
judgement and is therefore almost always discarded. Constructive critiques are
few and far between, which creates an echo chamber that contributes to groupthink
and the creation of an alternative reality. This delays much-needed reforms
since those responsible for ordering them don’t even know that they’re needed
until problems become too serious to be denied or ignored by those below them.
Accountability doesn’t usually
follow reforms either since those who denied or ignored the problems that gave
rise to them are rarely punished, let alone let go from their positions. They
simply plead ignorance or find scapegoats, either of which usually satisfies
their superiors. These same superiors also don’t often decide to create
feedback loops or improve whatever existing ones they have after ordering
reforms to be made since groupthink has deluded them into thinking that no
systemic problems exist.
The preceding paragraphs are admittedly harsh, but they explain why “Russians saddle slow”, whether in terms of bureaucracy, business, diplomacy, military affairs, or whatever else. They only begin to “ride fast” once superiors realize that systemic problems exist and require reforms to resolve, after which the “power verticals” that Russia is known for kick into gear due to discipline and fear of further upsetting the angry superior. Something of the sort might finally be happening with the special operation.
Andrew Korybko, Substack, October 3, 2024
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