Lebanon was created out of the Sykes-Picot
Agreement. This agreement between Britain and France reshaped the collapsed
Ottoman Empire south of Turkey into the states we know today -- Lebanon, Syria
and Iraq, and to some extent the Arabian Peninsula as well. For nearly 100
years, Sykes-Picot defined the region. A strong case can be made that the
nation-states Sykes-Picot created are now defunct, and that what is occurring
in Syria and Iraq represents the emergence of those post-British/French maps
that the United States has been trying to maintain since the collapse of
Franco-British power.
The Invention of Middle East Nation-States
Sykes-Picot, named for French diplomat Francois
Georges-Picot and his British counterpart, Sir Mark Sykes, did two things.
First, it created a British-dominated Iraq. Second, it divided the Ottoman
province of Syria on a line from the Mediterranean Sea east through Mount
Hermon. Everything north of this line was French. Everything south of this line
was British. The French, who had been involved in the Levant since the 19th
century, had allies among the region's Christians. They carved out part of
Syria and created a country for them. Lacking a better name, they called it
Lebanon, after the nearby mountain of the same name.
The British named the area to the west of the
Jordan River after the Ottoman administrative district of Filistina, which
turned into Palestine on the English tongue. However, the British had a
problem. During World War I, while the British were fighting the Ottoman Turks,
they had allied with a number of Arabian tribes seeking to expel the Turks. Two
major tribes, hostile to each other, were the major British allies. The British
had promised postwar power to both. It gave the victorious Sauds the right to
rule Arabia -- hence Saudi Arabia. The other tribe, the Hashemites, had already
been given the newly invented Iraqi monarchy and, outside of Arabia, a narrow
strip of arable ground to the east of the Jordan River. For lack of a better
name, it was called Trans-Jordan, or the other side of the Jordan. In due
course the "trans" was dropped and it became Jordan.
And thus, along with Syria, five entities were created between the
Mediterranean and Tigris, and between Turkey and the new nation of Saudi
Arabia. This five became six after the United Nations voted to create Israel in
1947. The Sykes-Picot agreement suited European models and gave the Europeans a
framework for managing the region that conformed to European administrative
principles. The most important interest, the oil in Iraq and the Arabian
Peninsula, was protected from the upheaval in their periphery as Turkey and
Persia were undergoing upheaval. This gave the Europeans what they wanted.
What it did not do was create a framework that
made a great deal of sense of the Arabs living in this region. The European model
of individual rights expressed to the nation-states did not fit their cultural
model. For the Arabs, the family -- not the individual -- was the fundamental
unit of society. Families belonged to clans and clans to tribes, not nations.
The Europeans used the concept of the nation-state to express divisions between
"us" and "them." To the Arabs, this was an alien framework,
which to this day still competes with religious and tribal identities.
The states the Europeans created were
arbitrary, the inhabitants did not give their primary loyalty to them, and the
tensions within states always went over the border to neighboring states. The
British and French imposed ruling structures before the war, and then a wave of
coups overthrew them after World War II. Syria and Iraq became pro-Soviet
states while Israel, Jordan and the Arabians became pro-American, and
monarchies and dictatorships ruled over most of the Arab countries. These
authoritarian regimes held the countries together.
Reality Overcomes Cartography
It was Lebanon that came apart first. Lebanon
was a pure invention carved out of Syria. As long as the Christians for whom
Paris created Lebanon remained the dominant group, it worked, although the
Christians themselves were divided into warring clans. But after World War II,
the demographics changed, and the Shiite population increased. Compounding this
was the movement of Palestinians into Lebanon in 1948. Lebanon thus became a
container for competing clans. Although the clans were of different religions,
this did not define the situation. Multiple clans in many of these religious
groupings fought each other and allied with other religions.
Moreover, Lebanon's issues were not confined to
Lebanon. The line dividing Lebanon from Syria was an arbitrary boundary drawn
by the French. Syria and Lebanon were not one country, but the newly created
Lebanon was not one country, either. In 1976 Syria -- or more precisely, the
Alawite dictatorship in Damascus -- invaded Lebanon. Its intent was to destroy
the Palestinians, and their main ally was a Christian clan. The Syrian invasion
set off a civil war that was already flaring up and that lasted until 1990.
Lebanon was divided into various areas
controlled by various clans. The clans evolved. The dominant Shiite clan was
built around Nabi Berri. Later, Iran sponsored another faction, Hezbollah. Each
religious faction had multiple clans, and within the clans there were multiple
competitors for power. From the outside it appeared to be strictly a religious
war, but that was an incomplete view. It was a competition among clans for
money, security, revenge and power. And religion played a role, but alliances
crossed religious lines frequently.
The state became far less powerful than the
clans. Beirut, the capital, became a battleground for the clans. The Israelis
invaded in order to crush the Palestinian Liberation Organization, with Syria's
blessing, and at one point the United States intervened, partly to block the
Israelis. When Hezbollah blew up the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, killing
hundreds of Marines, U.S. President Ronald Reagan, realizing the amount of
power it would take to even try to stabilize Lebanon, withdrew all troops. He
determined that the fate of Lebanon was not a fundamental U.S. interest, even if
there was a Cold War underway.
The complexity of Lebanon goes far beyond this
description, and the external meddling from Israel, Syria, Iran and
the United States is even more complicated. The point is that the clans became
the reality of Lebanon, and the Lebanese government became irrelevant. An
agreement was reached between the factions and their patrons in 1989 that ended
the internal fighting -- for the most part -- and strengthened the state. But in
the end, the state existed at the forbearance of the clans. The map may show a
nation, but it is really a country of microscopic clans engaged in a
microscopic geopolitical struggle for security and power. Lebanon remains a
country in which the warlords have become national politicians, but there is
little doubt that their power comes from being warlords and that, under
pressure, the clans will reassert themselves.
Repeats in Syria and Iraq
A similar process has taken place in Syria. The
arbitrary nation-state has become a region of competing clans. The Alawite
clan, led by Bashar al Assad (who has played the roles of warlord and
president), had ruled the country. An uprising supported by various countries
threw the Alawites into retreat. The insurgents were also divided along
multiple lines. Now, Syria resembles Lebanon. There is one large clan, but it
cannot destroy the smaller ones, and the smaller ones cannot destroy the large
clan. There is a permanent stalemate, and even if the Alawites are destroyed,
their enemies are so divided that it is difficult to see how Syria can go back
to being a country, except as a historical curiosity. Countries like Turkey,
Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States might support various clans, but in
the end, the clans survive.
Something very similar happened in Iraq. As the Americans departed, the government
that was created was dominated by Shia, who were fragmented. To a great degree,
the government excluded the Sunnis, who saw themselves in danger of
marginalization. The Sunnis consisted of various tribes and clans (some containing
Shiites) and politico-religious movements like the Islamic State. They rose up
in alliance and have now left Baghdad floundering, the Iraqi army seeking
balance and the Kurds scrambling to secure their territory.
It is a three-way war, but in some ways it is a
three-way war with more than 20 clans involved in temporary alliances. No one
group is strong enough to destroy the others on the broader level. Sunni,
Shiite and Kurd have their own territories. On the level of the tribes and
clans, some could be destroyed, but the most likely outcome is what happened in
Lebanon: the permanent power of the sub-national groups, with perhaps some
agreement later on that creates a state in which power stays with the smaller
groups, because that is where loyalty lies.
The boundary between Lebanon and Syria was always uncertain. The border between
Syria and Iraq is now equally uncertain. But then these borders were never
native to the region. The Europeans imposed them for European reasons.
Therefore, the idea of maintaining a united Iraq misses the point. There was
never a united Iraq -- only the illusion of one created by invented kings and
self-appointed dictators. The war does not have to continue, but as in Lebanon,
it will take the exhaustion of the clans and factions to negotiate an end.
The idea that Shia, Sunnis and Kurds can live
together is not a fantasy. The fantasy is that the United States has the power
or interest to re-create a Franco-British invention crafted out of the debris
of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, even if it had an interest, it is doubtful
that the United States has the power to pacify Iraq and Syria. It could not
impose calm in Lebanon. The triumph of the Islamic State would represent a serious
problem for the United States, but no more than it would for the Shia, Kurds
and other Sunnis. As in Lebanon, the multiplicity of factions creates a
countervailing force that cripples those who reach too far.
There are two issues here. The first is how far
the disintegration of nation-states will go in the Arab world. It seems to be
underway in Libya, but it has not yet taken root elsewhere. It may be a
political formation in the Sykes-Picot areas. Watching the Saudi peninsula will
be most interesting. But the second issue is what regional powers will do about
this process. Turkey, Iran, Israel and the Saudis cannot be comfortable with
either this degree of fragmentation or the spread of more exotic groups. The
rise of a Kurdish clan in Iraq would send tremors to the Turks and Iranians.
The historical precedent, of course, would be
the rise of a new Ottoman attitude in Turkey that would inspire the Turks to
move south and impose an acceptable order on the region. It is hard to see how
Turkey would have the power to do this, plus if it created unity among the
Arabs it would likely be because the memories of Turkish occupation still sting
the Arab mind.
All of this aside, the point is that it is time
to stop thinking about stabilizing Syria and Iraq and start thinking of a new
dynamic outside of the artificial states that no longer function. To do this,
we need to go back to Lebanon, the first state that disintegrated and the first
place where clans took control of their own destiny because they had to. We are
seeing the Lebanese model spread eastward. It will be interesting to see where
else its spreads.
George Friedman, Stratfor, Aug. 26, 2014
"Iraq and Syria Follow Lebanon's Precedent is republished with
permission of Stratfor."
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