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Syrian troops, May 13, in
Western Dumayna, which is 7 kilometers (4.3 miles) north of Qusayr. Photo:
Joseph Eid/AFP/Getty Images
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Stratfor
Summary
The battle for the Syrian city
of Al-Qusayr, which came under regime artillery fire May 19, is actually part
of a larger battle for the highly coveted Homs governorate. As we noted in
2012, the battle has wide-reaching ramifications for the Syrian rebels since
Al-Qusayr sits along a major transit point for rebel supplies and
reinforcements coming in from Lebanon. But it is equally important to loyalist
forces. If the Syrian regime loses control of the Orontes River Valley and its
major road junctions, Damascus will be largely cut off from Aleppo and the
Alawite-dominated coast, which would limit the regime's access to supply lines
from port cities.
The regime's renewed offensive
against Al-Qusayr was made possible by support from Iran, Russia and Hezbollah.
However, geography will determine which side holds the advantage. In northern
and eastern Syria, the regime remains on the defensive; in the core, the
advantage clearly belongs to the loyalists. With the country squarely divided,
the Syrian civil war will continue to be a protracted conflict -- even as the
regime prevails in Al-Qusayr.
Analysis
Supported by Hezbollah
fighters, loyalist forces began their offensive against Al-Qusayr with a
barrage of artillery fire. Given that the rebels are entrenched in static
positions throughout the city, massed artillery fire can have a particularly
devastating effect. Regime forces are largely deployed to the north and east of
the city, while fighters affiliated with Hezbollah are reportedly advancing on
the city from the south and west.
Hezbollah has long been
involved in the fight over Homs, but the May 19 offensive marks a clear
escalation in Hezbollah's involvement. Tensions in Lebanon have grown alongside
this increased involvement. For example, rebels struck the Lebanese town of
Hermel with rocket artillery on May 19. And the anger Lebanese Sunnis feel toward
Hezbollah threatens to spill over into a full-blown armed conflict.
External Support
Al-Qusayr is not the only
theater in which al Assad has received considerable external support. Iran and
Russia continue to deliver much-needed material and equipment, including spare
parts needed to maintain the regime's critical advantage over the rebels: the
air force. Tehran and Moscow also have reportedly played a major role in giving
economic support, which is used to fund the war effort and pay hefty salaries
to security forces.
External help also enabled
Syria to create a new militia, known as the National Defense Force, to offset
the losses incurred by the army. With the help of Iranian and Hezbollah
advisers, the regime was able to rapidly train and deploy members of this
militia. The National Defense Force has brought reliable manpower to the
loyalist cause, but equally important, it has helped free up the conventional
army to execute difficult offensive operations.
Bolstered by this external aid, the loyalist forces have been increasingly able to crack down on rebel positions within the Syrian core, which extends from Damascus to the Alawite coast and passes through the Homs governorate. This division creates problems for both sides. Al Assad's forces are currently incapable of launching comprehensive offensives to relieve their positions in the north and the east. For their part, the rebels are also finding it almost impossible to relieve their beleaguered comrades in Homs city and Al-Qusayr.
Bolstered by this external aid, the loyalist forces have been increasingly able to crack down on rebel positions within the Syrian core, which extends from Damascus to the Alawite coast and passes through the Homs governorate. This division creates problems for both sides. Al Assad's forces are currently incapable of launching comprehensive offensives to relieve their positions in the north and the east. For their part, the rebels are also finding it almost impossible to relieve their beleaguered comrades in Homs city and Al-Qusayr.
In fact, over the past few
months, fighting has regressed to battles of exhaustion and campaigns of
attrition. Instances where the rebels could quickly seize a major city in only
a few days -- as they did in Raqqa -- are the exception rather than the norm.
Controlling Homs
In the battle for Homs,
external support gives the regime the military edge. But despite this
superiority, the regime probably will not stamp out the rebel resistance entirely,
even if it retakes Al-Qusayr. Time and again the rebels have demonstrated a
talent for retreating from areas in which the regime musters overwhelming
force. The regime has been careful to surround Al-Qusayr from all directions,
but the rebels will continue to escape through regime gaps into the countryside
or to other rebel strongholds in Homs, such as Rastan and Talbiseh.
However, thanks to
considerable Hezbollah aid, the regime has largely subdued rebel operations in
the Homs governorate, a goal it has tried to achieve since the early stages of
the rebellion. Control over Homs will enable al Assad to rapidly move forces
from the north to the south to meet emerging rebel threats. It will also
provide a key avenue of retreat to the Alawite coast in the event that he needs
to flee Damascus.
"Syria: Outside Patronage and a New Offensive for the Regime is republished
with permission of Stratfor."
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