Kamran Bokhari
Geopolitically, a trip to Iran
could not come at a better time. Iran is an emerging power seeking to exploit
the vacuum created by the departure of U.S. troops from Iraq, which is
scheduled to conclude in a little more than three months. Tehran also plays a
major role along its eastern border, where Washington is seeking a political
settlement with the Taliban to facilitate a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.
The Islamic republic
simultaneously is trying to steer popular
unrest in the Arab world in its favor. That unrest in turn has significant
implications for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, an issue in which Iran has
successfully inserted itself over the years. The question of the U.S.-Iranian
relationship also looms — does accommodation or confrontation lie ahead? At the
same time, the Iranian state — a unique hybrid of Shiite theocracy and Western
republicanism — is experiencing intense domestic power struggles.
This is the geopolitical
context in which I arrived at Imam Khomeini International airport late Sept.
16. Along with several hundred foreign guests, I had been invited to attend a
Sept. 17-18 event dubbed the “Islamic Awakening” conference, organized by the
office of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Given the state of
Iranian-Western ties and my position as a senior analyst with a leading
U.S.-based private intelligence company, the invitation came as surprise.
With some justification,
Tehran views foreign visitors as potential spies working to undermine Iranian
national security. The case of the
American hikers jailedin Iran (two of whom were released the day of my return to Canada)
provided a sobering example of tourism devolving into accusations of espionage.
Fortunately for me, STRATFOR
had not been placed on the list of some 60 Western organizations (mostly
American and British think tanks and civil society groups) banned as seditious
in early 2010 following the failed Green Movement uprising. Still, the Iranian
regime is well aware of our views on Iranian
geopolitics.
In addition to my concerns
about how Iranian authorities would view me, I also worried about how attending
a state-sponsored event designed to further Iranian geopolitical interests
where many speakers heavily criticized the United States and Israel would look
in the West. In the end, I set my trepidations aside and opted for the trip.
Geopolitical Observations
in Tehran
STRATFOR CEO and founder
George Friedman has written of geopolitical
journeys, of how people from diverse national backgrounds visiting other
countries see places in very different ways. In my case, my Pakistani heritage,
American upbringing, Muslim religious identity and Canadian nationality allowed
me to navigate a milieu of both locals and some 700 delegates of various Arab
and Muslim backgrounds. But the key was in the way STRATFOR trains its analysts
to avoid the pitfall that many succumb to — the blurring of what is really
happening with what we may want to see happen.
The foreigner arriving in Iran
immediately notices that despite 30 years of increasingly severe sanctions, the
infrastructure and systems in the Islamic republic appear fairly solid. As a
developing country and an international pariah, one would expect infrastructure
along the lines of North Korea or Cuba. But Iran’s construction, transportation
and communications infrastructure shares more in common with apartheid-era
South Africa, and was largely developed indigenously.
Also notable was the absence
of any visible evidence of a police state. Considering the state’s enormous
security establishment and the recent unrest surrounding the Green Movement, I
expected to see droves of elite security forces. I especially expected this in
the northern districts of the capital, where the more Westernized segment of
society lives and where I spent a good bit of time walking and sitting in
cafes.
Granted, I didn’t stay for
long and was only able to see a few areas of the city to be able to tell, but
the only public display of opposition to the regime was “Death to Khamenei”
graffiti scribbled in small letters on a few phone booths on Vali-e-Asr Avenue
in the Saadabad area. I saw no sign of Basij
or Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corpspersonnel patrolling the streets, only
the kind of police presence one will find in many countries.
This normal security
arrangement gave support to STRATFOR’s view from the very beginning that the unrest
in 2009 was not something the regime couldn’t contain. As we wrote
then and I was able to see firsthand last week, Iran has enough people who —
contrary to conventional wisdom — support the regime, or at the very least do
not seek its downfall even if they disagree with its policies.
I saw another sign of support
for the Islamic republic a day after the conference ended, when the organizers
arranged a tour of the mausoleum of the republic’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini. We visited the large complex off a main highway on the southern end
of town on a weekday; even so, numerous people had come to the shrine to pay
their respects — several with tears in their eyes as they prayed at the tomb.
Obviously, the intensity of
religious feelings varies in Iran, but a significant stratum of the public
remains deeply religious and still believes in the national narrative of the
revolutionary republic. This fact does not get enough attention in the Western
media and discourse, clouding foreigners’ understanding of Iran and leading to
misperceptions of an autocratic clergy clinging to power only by virtue of a
massive security apparatus.
In the same vein, I had
expected to see stricter enforcement of religious attire on women in public
after the suppression of the Green Movement. Instead, I saw a light-handed
approach on the issue. Women obeyed the requirement to cover everything but
their hands and faces in a variety of ways. Some women wore the traditional
black chador. Others wore long shirts and pants and scarves covering their
heads. Still others were dressed in Western attire save a scarf over their
head, which was covering very little of their hair.
The dress code has become a
political issue in Iran, especially in recent months in the context of the struggle
between conservative factions. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has
encountered growing opposition from both pragmatic and ultraconservative
forces, has come under criticism from clerics and others for alleged moral
laxity when it comes to female dress codes. Even so, the supreme leader has not
moved to challenge Ahmadinejad on this point.
Ahmadinejad and the
Clerical-Political Divide
In sharp contrast with his
first term, Ahmadinejad — the most ambitious and assertive president since the
founding of the Islamic republic in 1979 — has been trying to position himself
as the pragmatist in his second term while his opponents come out looking like
hard-liners. In recent months his statements have become less religiously
informed, though they have retained their nationalist and radical anti-Western
tone.
For example, his speech at the
conclusion of the second day of the conference on the theme of the event,
Islamic Awakening, was articulated in non-religious language. This stood in
sharp contrast to almost every other speaker. Ahmadinejad spoke of recent Arab
unrest in terms of a struggle for freedom, justice and emancipation for
oppressed peoples, while his criticism of the United States and Israel was
couched in terms of how the two countries’ policies were detrimental to global
peace as opposed to the raw ideological vitriol that we have seen in the not
too distant past.
But while Iran’s intra-elite
political struggles complicate domestic and foreign policymaking, they are not
about to bring down the Islamic republic — at least not anytime soon. In the
longer term, the issue at the heart of all disputes — that of shared governance
by clerics and politicians — does pose a significant challenge to the regime.
This tension has existed throughout the nearly 32-year history of the Islamic
republic, and it will continue to be an issue into the foreseeable future as
Iran focuses heavily on the foreign policy front.
Iran’s Regional Ambitions
In fact, the conference was
all about Iran’s foreign policy ambitions to assume intellectual and
geopolitical leadership of the unrest in the Arab world. Iran is well aware
that it is in competition with Turkey over leadership for the Middle East and
that Ankara is in a far better position than Iran economically, diplomatically
and religiously as a Sunni power. Nevertheless, Iran is trying to position
itself as the champion of the Arab masses who have risen up in opposition to
autocratic regimes. The Iranian view is that Turkey cannot lead the region
while remaining aligned with Washington and that Saudi Arabia’s lack of
enthusiasm for the uprisings works in Tehran’s favor.
The sheer number of Iranian
officials who are bilingual (fluent in Persian and Arabic) highlights the
efforts of Tehran to overcome the ethno-linguistic geopolitical constraints it
faces as a Persian country trying to operate in a region where most Muslim
countries are Arab. While its radical anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli position has
allowed it to circumvent the ethnic factor and attract support in the Arab and
Muslim worlds, its Shiite
sectarian character has allowed its opponents in Riyadh and elsewhere
to restrict Iranian regional influence. In fact, Saudi Arabia remains a major
bulwark against Iranian attempts expand its influence across the Persian Gulf
and into Arabian Peninsula, as has been clear by the success that the Saudis have
had in containing the largely Shiite uprising in Bahrain against the country’s
Sunni monarchy.
Even so, Iran has developed
some close relations across the sectarian divide, something obvious from the
foreign participants invited to the conference. Thus in addition to the many
Shiite leaders from Lebanon and Iraq and other parts of the Islamic world, the
guest list included deputy Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzook; Palestinian Islamic
Jihad (PIJ) chief Ramadan Abdullah Shallah; a number of Egyptian religious, political,
intellectual and business notables; the chief adviser to Sudanese President
Omar al Bashir as well as the leader of the country’s main opposition party,
Sadiq al-Mahdi; a number of Sunni Islamist leaders from Pakistan and
Afghanistan, including former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani whom I had
the opportunity of speaking with only two days before he was assassinated in
Kabul; and the head of Malaysia’s main Islamist group, PAS, which runs
governments in a few states — just to name a few.
Tehran has had much less
success in breaching the ideological chasm, something evidenced by the dearth
of secular political actors at the conference. Its very name, Islamic
Awakening, was hardly welcoming to secularists. It also did not accurately
reflect the nature of the popular agitation in the Arab countries, which is not
being led by forces that seek revival of religion. The Middle East could be
described as experiencing a political awakening, but not a religious awakening
given that Islamist forces are latecomers to the cause.
A number of my hosts asked me
what I thought of the conference, prompting me to address this conceptual
discrepancy. I told them that the name Islamic Awakening only made sense if one
was referring the Islamic world, but that even this interpretation was flawed
as the current unrest has been limited to Arab countries.
While speaker after speaker
pressed for unity among Muslim countries and groups in the cause of revival and
the need to support the Arab masses in their struggle against autocracy, one
unmistakable tension was clear. This had to do with Syria, the only state in
the Arab world allied with Iran. A number of speakers and members of the
audience tried to criticize the Syrian regime’s efforts to crush popular
dissent, but the discomfort this caused was plain. Syria has proven
embarrassing for Iran and even groups like Hezbollah, Hamas and PIJ, which are
having a hard time reconciling their support for the Arab unrest on one hand
and supporting the Syrian regime against its dissidents on the other.
The Road Ahead
Attending this conference
allowed me to meet and observe many top Iranian civil and military officials
and the heads of Arab and other Muslim non-state actors with varying degree of
relationships with Tehran. Analyzing them from a distance one tends to dismiss
their ideology and statements as rhetoric and propaganda. Some of what they say
is rhetoric, but beneath the rhetoric are also convictions.
We in the West often expect
Iran to succumb to international pressure, seek rehabilitation in the
international community and one day become friendly with the West. We often
talk of a U.S.-Iranian
rapprochement, but at a strategic level, the Iranian leadership has other
plans.
While Iran would like
normalized relations with Washington and the West, it is much more interested
in maintaining its independence in foreign policy matters, not unlike China’s
experience since establishing relations with the United States. As one Iranian
official told me at the conference, when Iran re-establishes ties with the
United States, it doesn’t want to behave like Saudi Arabia or to mimic Turkey
under the Justice and Development Party.
Whether or not Iran will
achieve its goals and to what extent remains unclear. The combination of
geography, demography and resources means Iran will remain at the center of an
intense geopolitical struggle, and I hope for further opportunities to observe
these developments firsthand.
Kamran Bokhari, Stratfor,
September 27, 2011, republished with permission of STRATFOR
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