The current
confrontation in Gaza began July 12 after three Israeli teenagers
disappeared in the West Bank the month before. Israel announced the disappearance June
13, shortly thereafter placing blame on Hamas for the kidnappings.
On June 14, Hamas fired three rockets into the Hof Ashkelon
region. This was followed by Israeli attacks on Palestinians in the
Jerusalem region. On July 8, the Israelis announced Operation Protective
Edge and began calling up reservists. Hamas launched a longer-range rocket at
Tel Aviv. Israel then increased its airstrikes against targets in Gaza.
At this point, it
would appear that Israel has deployed sufficient force to be ready to conduct
an incursion into Gaza. However, Israel has not done so yet. The conflict has
consisted of airstrikes and some special operations forces raids by
Israel and rocket launches by Hamas against targets in Israel.
From a purely
military standpoint, the issue has been Hamas's search for a deterrent to
Israeli operations against Gaza. Operation Cast Lead in late 2008 and early
2009 disrupted Gaza deeply, and Hamas found itself without any options beyond
attempts to impose high casualties on Israeli forces. But the size of the
casualties in Cast Lead did not prove a deterrent.
Hamas augmented its
short-range rocket arsenal with much longer-range rockets. The latest
generation of rockets it has acquired can reach the population center of
Israel: the triangle of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa. However, these are
rockets, not missiles. That means they have no guidance system, and their point
of impact once launched is a matter of chance. Given these limits, Hamas hoped
having a large number of rockets of different ranges would create the risk of
substantial Israeli civilian casualties, and that that risk would deter Israel
from action against Gaza.
The threat posed by
the rockets was in fact substantial. According to senior Israeli Air Force
officers quoted on the subject, Israel lacked intelligence on precisely where
the rockets were stored and all the sites from which they might be launched.
Gaza is honeycombed with a complex of tunnels, many quite deep. This limits
intelligence. It also limits the ability of Israeli airborne munitions from
penetrating to their storage area and destroying them.
The Israeli objective
is to destroy Hamas' rocket capacity. Israel ideally would like to do this
from the air, but while some can be destroyed from the air, and from special
operations, it appears the Israelis lack the ability to eliminate the threat.
The only solution would be a large-scale assault on Gaza designed to occupy it
such that a full-scale search for the weapons and their destruction on the
ground would be possible.
Hamas has been firing
rockets to convince the Israelis that they have enough to increase casualties
in the triangle if they choose to. The Israelis must in fact assume that
an assault on Gaza would in its earliest stages result in a massive barrage,
especially since Hamas would be in a "use-it-or-lose-it" position.
Hamas hopes this will deter an Israeli attack.
Thus far, Israel has
restrained its attack beyond airstrikes. The extent to which the fear of massed
rocketry was the constraining factor is not clear. Certainly, the Israelis are
concerned that Hamas is better prepared for an attack than it was during Cast
Lead, and that its ability to use anti-tank missiles against Israel's Merkava
tanks and improvised explosive devices against infantry has evolved. Moreover,
the occupation of Gaza would be costly and complex. It would take perhaps weeks
to search for rockets and in that time, Israeli casualties would mount. When
the political consequences, particularly in Europe, of such an attack were
added to this calculus, the ground component of Protective Edge was put off.
As mentioned, a major
issue for the Israelis is the intelligence factor. It is said that Iran
provided Hamas with these rockets via smuggling routes through Sudan. It is hard
to imagine the route these weapons would take such that Israeli (and American)
intelligence would not detect them on their thousand-plus mile transit, and
that they would move into Gaza in spite of Israeli and Egyptian hostile
watchfulness. Even if Iran didn't provide the weapons, and someone else did,
the same question would arise.
The failure of the
Israelis to detect and interdict the movement of rockets or rocket parts has an
immediate effect on the confidence with which senior Israeli commanders and
political leaders calculate their course. Therefore, to this point, there has
been a stalemate, with what we assume is a small fraction of Hamas' rockets
being fired, and limited operations against Gaza. The ground operation is being
held in check for now.
While there have been
a few public attempts to mediate between Hamas and Israel, most of these
efforts have been lackluster, and the condemnations of violence and calls for
peace have been more perfunctory than usual. Rather than leaving Egypt as the
principle mediator, Turkey and Qatar have also weighed into the cease-fire
discussion. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry also reportedly contacted
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Sunday, offering assistance in
mediating a truce. Meanwhile, high-ranking diplomats from the United States,
the United Kingdom, France and Germany discussed truce efforts on the sidelines
of talks on Iran, and Israel’s government has began mulling a plan to offer
development aid in exchange for a demilitarization of Gaza.
There is good reason
for the slow pace of these cease-fire efforts, however. As evidenced by Hamas'
ability to replenish its rocket supply through routes traversing Sinai, Israel
cannot rely exclusively on Egypt to uphold a cease-fire agreement -- nor does
it trust Qatar and Turkey to do so. Instead, Israel is attempting to place responsibility
for cease-fire enforcement on its main external patron, the United States. Of
equal importance, Hamas shares a deep distrust of the current regime in Egypt,
given Hamas' past links to the Muslim Brotherhood, whose brief reign in Egypt
ended with a military coup. As these negotiations move slowly forward, Israel's
focus is on trying to degrade Hamas' military capabilities enough to compensate
for the weaknesses implicit in any cease-fire agreement. But tackling the
problem primarily through the air has limits, and Israel's questionable
confidence in its own intelligence is what has prevented a ground incursion so
far.
The problem for
Israel in any cease-fire is that it would keep the current status quo in place.
Hamas would retain its rockets, and might be able to attain more advanced
models. Israel was not able to stop the influx of this load, so Israel can't be
confident that it can stop the next. A cease-fire is a victory for Hamas
because they have retained their rocket force and have the potential to
increase it. But for Israel, if it assumes that it cannot absorb the cost of
rooting out all of the rockets (assuming that is possible) then a cease-fire
brings it some political benefits without having to take too many risks.
At this moment, we know
for certain that Israel is bombing Gaza and has amassed a force sufficient to
initiate ground operations but has not done so. Hamas has not fired a
saturation attack, assuming it could, but has forced Israel to assume that such
an attack is possible, and that its Iron Dome defensive system would be
overwhelmed by the numbers. The next move is Israel's. We can assume there are
those in the Israeli command authority arguing that the Gaza rockets will be
fired at some point, and must be eliminated now, and others arguing that
without better intelligence the likelihood of casualties and of triggering a
saturation launch is too high.
We have no idea who
will win the argument, if there is one, but right now, Israel is holding.
George Friedman, Stratfor, July 14,
2014
"Gaza Situation Report is republished with permission of Stratfor."
Nenhum comentário:
Postar um comentário
Não publicamos comentários de anônimos/desconhecidos.
Por favor, se optar por "Anônimo", escreva o seu nome no final do comentário.
Não use CAIXA ALTA, (Não grite!), isto é, não escreva tudo em maiúsculas, escreva normalmente. Obrigado pela sua participação!
Volte sempre!
Abraços./-